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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
NARRATIVES ABOUT RACE AND JUSTICE

BENJAMIN BAEZ*
I start this essay with what may be a simple premise: judges tell stories in
order to persuade others that their opinions are the correct ones. I end with a
more complicated premise: the affirmative action “stories” illustrate not only
how judges attempt to persuade others but also how language constitutes
oppressive social structures. The social phenomenon that is affirmative action
should be understood within the discursive field of law, which gives meaning
and organization to social institutions and defines justice in ways that serve
particular interests and values.1 By exposing the predominance of certain
stories in the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases, I suggest that the
judiciary, rather than being an instrument of justice, actually enforces social
hierarchies which benefit certain social groups (e.g., Whites, men, the wealthy)
and discourses (e.g., individualism, color-blindness) over others.
I suggest as well that the narratives used in the affirmative action cases
enact against historically-subordinated social groups, especially African
Americans, a kind of violence through speech. This violence, however, is
legitimated by legal and social conventions purporting to frame social conflict
in neutral ways. The violence is sustained by the stories that permeate social
relationships and practices (e.g., those of individual merit), which create
hierarchies among individuals and allow courts to justify those hierarchies. I
conclude that resistance must include “counter-stories” that oppose the
oppressive tendencies of those that are currently privileged in this society.
In this essay, I begin with a presentation of my conceptual framework,
which is premised on the notions that law consists of “texts” that reflect our
social world, but these “texts” can not be dissociated from the heterogeneous
forms of power that permeate social relationships. Next, I provide a brief
overview of affirmative action in the United States and its legal history in the
Supreme Court. The body of the essay consists of my analysis of the Supreme

* Georgia State University, Education Policy Studies. Adapted from a paper presented at the
1999 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association Montreal, Quebec,
Canada.
1. See CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE & POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY 34 (2d ed.
1987).
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Court cases. Finally, I suggest a strategy for counteracting the predominant
narratives of affirmative action.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Law as Discourse
Law might be characterized as a “discursive field,” which consists of
competing ways of giving meaning to the world and of organizing social
institutions and processes. . . . Within a discursive field, however, not all
discourses carry equal weight or power.”2 Discursive fields contain multiple,
often conflicting types of discourse that seek to define and shape individuals’
behavior. By ‘discourse’ I mean more than just oral or written language; a
discourse includes “our ways of speaking and writing, but also our ways of
behaving, thinking, valuing, interacting, and feeling.”3 A discourse, therefore,
creates knowledge, and it becomes effective when it is realized in institutional
practices.4 For example, the discursive field of law is constituted by numerous
competing types of discourse (e.g., ‘color-blind’ versus ‘race-conscious’), but
law privileges a discourse of racial discrimination that attributes it to the
isolated acts of prejudiced individuals.5 An individualistic understanding of
discrimination permits courts to punish individual offenders while ignoring
how institutional practices (e.g., standardized testing, seniority) affect
negatively certain racial and ethnic minorities and White women. Given how
discourse becomes ‘practices,’ therefore, it is important to understand,
following Foucault, affirmative action’s “discursive fact,” or the way it is “put
into discourse.”6
My first premise, therefore, is that law is a discursive practice. Law
usually is not viewed as discourse; instead, the tendency of legal scholars is to
analyze law for its rules, the structure of its institutions, or the effects of
judicial rulings.7 But law is, as White indicated, a rhetorical activity, and so
legal analysis should pay attention to its “narratives.” In other words, an
understanding of law as rhetoric accounts for how law, as language, makes

2. Id.
3. MARC PRUYN, DISCOURSE WARS IN GOTHAM-WEST: A LATINO IMMIGRANT URBAN
TALE OF RESISTANCE AND AGENCY 45-46 (1999).
4. See WEEDON, supra note 1, at 109.
5. See Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29-30 (KimberlJ Crenshaw, et al. eds., 1995).
6. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION VOLUME I, at 11
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
7. JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW 29-30 (1985).
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community and culture, intentions and motives, subjects and values. White
contended that law is “constitutive in nature;” that is,
it creates a set of questions that reciprocally define and depend upon a world of
thought and action; it creates a set of roles and voices by which meanings will
be established and shared. In creating both a set of topics and a set of occasions
and methods for public speech it does much to constitute us as community and
as a polity. In all of this it has its own ways of working, which are to be found
not in the rules that seem to be at the center of the structure, but in the culture
that determines how these rules are to be read and talked about.8

White recognized how legal language, with its unique rules and structures,
draws upon the culture within which it is made. In this regard, legal texts can
not be dissociated from other “common” texts—”the associations, allusions,
and references that makes us what we are.”9
A legal text, for White, stands not only for a kind of policy science,
economics, or social process but also a “composition,” which is “made by one
mind speaking to another, constructed out of innumerable choices of words
and phrases—as a text whose author decides what belongs within it, and what
shall be left out, and how its elements shall be characterized and related.”10
What is important in a legal text is not necessarily the main idea (i.e., the
ruling or the rule of law), but how that idea is given meaning by the text. And
determining that meaning requires understanding the contexts of the other texts
that make up individuals’ lives. Thus, the law’s associations, connotations,
allusions, and references must be viewed in conjunction with “the terms and
processes of ordinary life and ordinary language.”11
Conventions of law require judges to justify their opinions, and so judges
must compose a justification for their decisions.12 These justificatory
compositions appear as “stories,” as LaRue explained; that is, judges tell
stories in order to persuade others that their opinions are justified.13 LaRue
argued that judicial opinions “are filled with ‘stories’ that purport to be
‘factual’ but that instead are ‘fictional,’ and furthermore, that these ‘fictions’
could not be eliminated without crippling the legal enterprise.”14 What LaRue
meant was that “[w]ithout persuasion, law could not be law, and without
fiction there would be no persuasion.”15 Legal analysis, therefore, should pay

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 123.
WHITE, supra note 7, at 123.
Id. at 240.
L. H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF
AUTHORITY 11 (1995).
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 11.
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attention to those moments in the cases when a story is told and to the nature of
that story (i.e., its associations, connotations, allusions, and references).
To say that law is rhetoric, however, might imply an attribution to
language of too small a role in the constitution of social reality. The liberalhumanist perspectives assume that human subjects possess a “unique essence,”
a “rational consciousness” which forms the basis for such political demands as
equality and self-determination.16 Since this human “subjectivity” is deemed
fixed and essential, language merely expresses that which already exists—
language in this sense is “transparent” and social change does not come about
through language.17 But such liberal-humanist perspectives fail to account for
how discourse, ideology, and heterogeneous forms of power constitute
subjectivity. In other words, these perspectives assume that human subjectivity
exists prior to, and creates, a particular form of discourse, ideology, or power.
But, as I suggest later in this section, human subjectivity may be the “effect,”
not author, of such discourse, ideology, or power.
Further elaborations of subjectivity are beyond the scope of this essay. But
an understanding of the complexity of language requires modification of
White’s notion of law as rhetoric, which appears to assume a fixed subjectivity
and transparency of language. White appropriately gives prominence to
language in legal analysis, but such analysis also should give prominence to
how discursive practices within law, and outside of it, give meaning and
organization to social institutions, practices, and relationships. Thus, while
following generally White’s notion of law as rhetoric, my conceptual
framework contains three other premises which modify that notion.
Law and Violence
My second premise is that judicial stories can not be dissociated from the
practice of political violence. Cover explained how a judge’s speech signals
the imposition of violence.18 He argued that
Legal interpretation takes place within a field of pain and death. This is true in
several senses. Legal interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of
violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a
result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.
Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has
already occurred or which is about the occur. When interpreters have finished
their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn
apart by these organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal

16. See WEEDON, supra note 1, at 77.
17. Id. at 74-5.
18. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 THE YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
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interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart
from one another.19

Cover explained as well that a judge’s speech is not merely rhetoric; it is also
“practice.” He argued that the judicial utterance is
institutional behavior in which others, occupying preexisting roles, can be
expected to act, to implement, or otherwise to respond in a specific way to the
judge’s interpretation. Thus, the institutional context ties the language act of
practical understanding to the physical acts of others in a predictable, though
not logically necessary way. These interpretations, then, are not only
‘practical,’ they are, themselves, practices.20

Judicial stories, therefore, do not just work as rhetoric, they are practices; they
initiate a process in which some actor will impose violence upon another. As
Cover explained, “when judges interpret, they trigger agentic behavior . . . that
loses its capacity to think and act autonomously.”21 In this way, individuals can
act to impose violence without feeling guilt. Furthermore, when these stories
are linked to ideology and power, they set the stage for the conditions of
effective domination.22
Law and Ideology
The third premise underlying my conceptual framework is that effective
domination is ensured by ideology. I define ideology broadly to mean the
systems of belief that tell individuals how to see the world. Legal
interpretation is ideological; the legal system serves the interests of those who
control its institutions and rules. Althusser, while following the Marxist notion
that state apparatuses (e.g., courts, government agencies, police) are repressive
(i.e., they use violence, ultimately, to enforce their prerogatives), argued that
state apparatuses also are ideological because they organize and promote the
ideology of the dominant class.23 For Althusser, ideological state apparatuses
included churches, courts, and schools. Courts, particularly, function
simultaneously through repressive mechanisms (e.g., they can initiate the
practice of violence), and ideology.
Ideology ensures domination because it is enforced not only through
repressive means but also through interpellation. According to Althusser,
individuals are interpellated (i.e., constituted or created) by the prevailing
ideology, but the force of this ideology is so pervasive and silent that

19. Id.
20. Id. at 1611.
21. Id. at 1615.
22. Id. at 1616. (emphasis in original)
23. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward an
Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY 146 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971).
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individuals come to think of their identities, actions, or situations as “obvious.”
He explained,
Like all obviousness, including those that make a word ‘name a thing’ or ‘have
a meaning’ . . . the obviousness that you and I are subjects [of some prevailing
ideology]—and that that does not cause any problems—is an ideological
effect, the elementary ideological effect.”24

Furthermore, language is the instrument of ideology, for the domination of the
ruling class is conducted “in words.”25 That is, the state apparatuses teach
“know-how,” but in the “forms which ensure subjection to the ruling ideology
or the mastery of its ‘practice.’”26 Language, therefore, might be inextricably
linked to ideology and does not merely express it.
Althusser theorized that the “site of class struggle” is within the ideological
state apparatuses.27 He argued that “the class (or class alliance) in power can
not lay down the law in the ideological state apparatuses as easily as it can in
the repressive state apparatuses, not only because the former ruling classes are
able to retain strong positions there for a long time, but also because the
resistance of the exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to
express itself there, either by the utilization of their contradictions, or by
conquering combat positions in them in struggle.”28 The class alliance in
power is less able to control the ideological state apparatuses than the
completely repressive ones (e.g., the police, the military), opening the way for
contestation in the ideological state apparatuses. Thus, because the ideological
practices of the ruling classes are not always effective, courts represent sites of
contestation in which conflicting ideologies (and their discourses) struggle for
dominance.
Law and “Disciplinary” Power
The last premise guiding my analysis is that power “coerces” social
institutions, practices, and relationships, but this power should be understood
“locally.” Given the focus on courts in this essay, the reliance is most heavily
on notions of language and its link to ideology, a link which explains how the
legal apparatus serves certain political interests and social arrangements. As
Foucault explained, however, ideology is the “effect” of power but not its
cause. Power, for Foucault, is everywhere local, in the minute details of
everyday life.29 Using Bentham’s conception of the panopticon prison (i.e., the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 133.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 147.
Althusser, supra note 23, at 147.
Michel Foucault, Body/Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS &
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 60 (Colin Gordon ed. & trans., 1980).
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tower surrounded by circular cells visible from the tower) as a metaphor for
power, Foucault argued that power is “disciplinary” and its effects are
normalization.30 To illustrate, the panopticon permits constant observation and
regulation, but its effectiveness lies in the fact that inmates, though unable to
observe in return, know they are under constant surveillance and behave
appropriately.31 Like the panopticon, power observes everywhere (it is
localized in institutions, practices, and relationships), and, though diffuse and
invisible, it regulates behavior so pervasively and silently that individuals
incorporate its normalizing-effects and regulate themselves. With an
understanding of law as narratives, but tied to violence, ideology, and power, I
now tell my story of affirmative action.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN DISCOURSE
Few topics are as controversial as affirmative action. Affirmative action
has been referred to as “a time bomb primed to detonate in the middle of the
American political marketplace.”32 This issue often has been a particularly
prominent subject of political campaigns, policy debates, and state referenda.33
Cooper argued that the “clearest and most pressing danger to the use of racial
preferences . . . is coming from the political process; the issue has been brought
to the surface by the California Civil Rights Initiative [Proposition 209].”34
Courts also are increasingly hearing cases challenging affirmative action
programs. And colleges and universities, particularly, have become sites for
the struggle over affirmative action.35 There are, for example, a number of
pending lawsuits against major public universities,36 and politicallyconservative organizations which oppose affirmative action have focused their
attention on colleges and universities.37

30. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200-01 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
31. Id.
32. Steven V. Roberts, Affirmative Action on the Edge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 3238, 32 (Feb. 13, 1995).
33. See Adam Cohen, “Affirmative Action Face Off,” TIME; Kristin Brainerd, Racial
Preference: Issue Stirs 2000 Ballot Outlook, 20 CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 6 (1999) Peter
Schrag, “The Diversity Defense,” 46 AMERICAN PROSPECT 57 (1999), available at
http://www.american prospect.com/archives/46/46schrag.html.
34. Charles Cooper, Race, Law, and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American
Dilemma, 45 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 567, 570-1 (1996).
35. Anti-Affirmative-Action Group Focuses New Campaign on Students and Trustees, 85
ACADEME 7 (1999).
36. JONATHAN ALGER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION: A CURRENT LEGAL
OVERVIEW (1998).
37. For example, the Center for Individual Rights, whose primary mission is to eliminate
affirmative and has initiated a number of lawsuits against colleges and universities, distributes to
college students and trustees the “Guilty by Admission” handbook, which explains their “rights”
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The federal government provided the impetus for affirmative action
through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196438 and Executive Orders
11246 and 11375. These Executive Orders, particularly, have been the major
focus of federal affirmative action initiatives by prohibiting discrimination
based on race, color, religion, gender, and national origin, and by requiring
federal contractors and subcontractors to develop affirmative action plans.39
Employers and institutions of higher education also may be subject to
affirmative action requirements regarding persons with disabilities, disabled
veterans, and Vietnam veterans under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act
and the Vietnam Era Veteran’s Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974.
Arguments for and Against Affirmative Action
Affirmative action is controversial because it is framed predominantly as
posing a conflict between two important American values: (1) all individuals
deserve an equal opportunity to achieve their goals, and (2) hard work and
merit—not race, gender, religion, or any other condition over which
individuals have no control—should determine which individuals succeed.40
How affirmative action is framed depends on which of these values is
privileged. For example, Eden and Ryan define affirmative action as a
“number of policies and practices meant to counter the effects of past racism
and level the playing field in today’s society.”41 Eden and Ryan’s definition
takes into consideration the historically-validated discrimination against certain
social groups and views affirmative action as necessary for allowing
individuals to achieve their goals. On the other hand, Markie defined

and advises them on ways to contribute to the elimination of racial preferences in higher
education, available at http://www.cir-usa.org.
38. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states (in relevant part):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
39. See BENJAMIN BAEZ & JOHN A. CENTRA, TENURE, PROMOTION, AND
REAPPOINTMENTS: LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS 106 (1995).
40. See generally, Dinesh D’Souza & Christopher Edley, Affirmative Action Debate: Should
Race-based Affirmative Action Be Abandoned as a National Policy? 60 ALBANY L. REV 425, 427
(1996); Charles Fried, Uneasy Preferences: Affirmative Action, In Retrospect, 46 AM. PROSPECT
50 (1999).
41. John M. Eden & John P. Ryan, Affirmative Action: Contentious Ideas and Controversial
Practices, 63 SOC. EDU. 110, 110 (1999).
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affirmative action as “giving special treatment to some candidates on the basis
of their membership in a target group.”42 Markie’s definition focuses on the
mere fact of differential treatment, and so it stresses the dilemma that
affirmative action poses for a meritocracy.
Many proponents of affirmative action argue that it is necessary to remedy
the effects of state-sanctioned discrimination against racial minorities.43 Other
proponents argue that giving certain social groups preferential treatment is
necessary to prevent discrimination.44 Some opponents, however, argue that
innocent people (often referring to White males) should not be penalized for
the injustices they personally did not commit.45 Other opponents of affirmative
action contend that preferential treatment does not benefit the individuals who
need the preferences most—low income individuals.46 Others argue that
affirmative action imposes on racial minorities a sense of inferiority47 or makes
them feel self-hatred and guilt.48
Much of the discourse of affirmative action occurs outside the legal arena.
But affirmative action, because it necessarily involves a redistribution of
resources, is a relevant subject of the discursive field of law. The current legal
status of affirmative action is difficult to gauge. Congress and a number of
state legislatures attempted to make affirmative action illegal in many
situations, or at least sharply limit its legality in public employment.49 The
Supreme Court decisions are sharply divided and inconsistent. Although, a
recent Supreme Court case severely restricted the use of affirmative action.50
Given the importance of the Court’s affirmative action discourse, I discuss its
history in the next section.

42. Peter J. Markie, Affirmative Action and the Awarding of Tenure, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND THE UNIVERSITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 276 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1993).
43. See, e.g., Benjamin Hooks, Affirmative Action Benefits Minorities, in RACISM IN
AMERICA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (William Dudley & Charles Cozic eds., 1991); RONALD J.
FISCUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 15-20 (1992); William Julius
Wilson, Affirming Opportunity, 46 AM. PROSPECT 61 (1997).
44. See Leslie Pickering Francis, In Defense of Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND THE UNIVERSITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, supra note 42, at 26-30.
45. See Frederick R. Lynch & William R. Beer, You Ain’t the Right Color, Pal, 51 POL’Y
REV. 64 (1990); Steven Yates, Affirmative Action Should Be Abandoned, in RACISM IN AMERICA:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 43, at 147-54.
46. See Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action Hurts Minorities, in RACISM IN AMERICA:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 43, at 133-38.
47. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA 116-17 (1990).
48. RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER AND MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD
RODRIGUEZ 167-72 (1982).
49. ALGER, supra note 36, at 2.
50. Adarand v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE SUPREME COURT
I focus in this paper on the Supreme Court because it not only provides the
rule of law for the disposition of affirmative action cases in federal and state
courts, but also its cases tell compelling stories about the social world. As
Freeman explained, the
Court is basically a storytelling institution. Its cases serve as instructive moral
parables, presented to most people as stark, melodramatic media distillations.
The Court’s stories must engage dialectically with other dominant political
institutions, with preexisting cultural assumptions, and other sources of
cultural authority (e.g., movies). In the long run, the Court offers a vision of
America that normalizes the existing patterns of inequality and hierarchy.51

The Court’s stories, I will argue, composed within one of the most significant
ideological state apparatus in the liberal state, illustrate how law legitimizes a
political and economic order which privileges certain discourses (e.g., “colorblindness,” legal formalism, and traditional notions of merit). These privileged
discourses benefit some groups over others (e.g., Whites, men). The cases
illustrate as well, however, how these privileged stories are contested by other
stories which provide different views of the social world.
Though I discuss cases in this essay, I did not follow established
conventions of legal interpretation.52 Rather, I conducted a narrative analysis
of the cases and relevant literature. I define narrative analysis broadly to mean
the broad application of literary theory to the cases; literary theory provides an
important avenue for political criticism given the pervasiveness of discursive
practices that constitute the social world.53 I follow generally Roe’s notion of
applying that theory to the politicized issue of affirmative action to see what
kind of “‘text’ one ends up with.”54 I draw heavily from multiple disciplines in
my analysis, specifically critical legal studies, critical race theory, philosophy,
policy analysis, poststructuralism, and sociology. These discourses permit an
eclectic but richer analysis of the cases.
Narrative analysis of cases provides an important vehicle for social
analysis for a number of reasons. First, legal texts are important because
judicial speech carries the power of the state. Second, as White, Cover, and
51. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction,
Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 285-311, at 286
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
52. I provide in this section a brief overview of the Court’s holdings in 11 cases that dealt
directly with preferential treatment. This overview focuses primarily on the official opinion and
does not refer often to dissenting or concurring opinions. The reliance on the official opinions, of
course, makes the Court seem monolithic. It is important to understand, however, that the legal
system consists of multiple, conflicting discourses, each seeking and gaining predominance at
different times. I attempt to highlight some of these discourses in the next section.
53. See TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 205 (1983).
54. See EMERY ROE, NARRATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-2 (1994).
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LaRue explained, law is a rhetorical activity (though inextricably linked to
violence) which reflects and remakes culture. Third, the stories generated by
the cases are a “force in themselves” in that they often “resist change or
modification, even in the presence of contradictory empirical data, because
they continue to underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for decision making
in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.”55 Finally,
narrative analysis is particularly useful for affirmative action cases because
legal discourse gives meaning to social structures, and the resolution of the
affirmative action cases necessarily involves decisions about social resources.
THE CASES
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases reveal, as West predicted,
the emergence of a “new paradigm” of “conservative constitutionalism . . .
[which has recently come to] dominate . . . the Supreme Court, may [now]
dominate the federal judiciary, and has already profoundly shaped the
constitutional law of the foreseeable future.”56 West explained that those
subscribing to this new paradigm articulate a profoundly conservative
interpretation of constitutional tradition, viewing “private and social normative
authority as the legitimate and best source of guidance for [government]
action.”57 Conservative constitutionalism contrasts sharply with “progressive”
constitutionalism, which views the “power and normative authority of some
social groups over others as the fruits of illegitimate private hierarchy.”58 The
Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases, particularly during the past decade,
illustrate the predominance of conservative ideology, but this ideology is
contested as evidenced by the Court’s failure often to reach a clear majority in
the cases and by the existence of progressive ideological positions.59
1)

DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974)60

The first affirmative action case before the Court was DeFunis, which
involved a challenge to the University of Washington Law School’s (UW)
admissions policies. DeFunis, a White male denied admission to UW, sued

55. Id. at 2.
56. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
642 (1990).
57. Id. at 643.
58. Id.
59. I narrowed my sample to those cases dealing with race and gender preferences in the
employment or college admissions context (11 cases). I quote often from judicial opinions, which
often are written with extensive citations and quotes from other opinions. For clarity, I eliminated
this extraneous material from my quotations.
60. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 UW used a
dual admission process for minority (defined as “Black, Chicano, American
Indian, and Filipino”) and non-minority candidates, and the former were
generally admitted with lower Law School Admission Test (“LSAT”) scores
and grade point averages (“GPAs”) than the latter. DeFunis won his case at
trial and was admitted to the University, and he was in attendance when the
California Supreme Court held that UW’s admissions policies were
constitutional. By the time the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments, DeFunis was in his last term at the law school and was due to
graduate regardless of the outcome of the case. The Court, therefore, dismissed
the lawsuit as moot. Justices Douglas’ dissenting opinion is particularly
important because it argued that UW’s admissions policies must be subjected
to strict scrutiny but that the reliance on the LSAT might be discriminatory.
Thus, though Douglas advocated the use of strict scrutiny, his progressive
ideological stance likely may have justified the use of affirmative action.
2)

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)62

Four years after DeFunis, the Court ruled on the merits of an affirmative
action claim in Bakke, probably the most important affirmative action case to
date. In this case, the Court struck down, without a true majority opinion, the
University of California-Davis Medical School’s (UC) affirmative action
policies, which included a separate admissions committee for candidates
identifying themselves as “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged”
and members of minority groups (i.e., “Blacks, Chicanos, Asians, American
Indians”). Unlike other candidates (e.g., Whites), the “special” candidates were
not summarily rejected if their GPAs were below 2.5. UC also set aside 16
seats for special candidates. Bakke, who applied twice to UC and was denied,
alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”).63 Five of the Supreme Court justices
combined to hold that UC’s policies involved racial quotas and were illegal,
but five justices indicated that race may be used as a factor in admissions
decisions.
Justice Powell’s opinion was the swing vote in a decision that invalidated
quotas but permitted other forms of affirmative action. Powell argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects Whites as it does racial minorities, and, thus,
“racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
61. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: “nor shall any state . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
63. Section 601 of Title VI states in relevant part: “No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. 2000d et. seq.
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for the most exacting judicial examination.”64 This argument extending the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to Whites might have set the stage for
the Court’s later, more conservative, opinions. Powell argued, however, that
the achievement of a diverse student body is a constitutionally-permissible
goal. Academic freedom, long “viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment,” allows UC the freedom to admit those students it believes will
contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas.”65 Nevertheless, Powell contended
that the kind of “diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses
a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial and
ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”66 Thus, UC’s policies,
which emphasized only ethnic diversity, hinders rather than furthers academic
freedom.
3)

United Steel Workers of America v. Weber (1979)67

The Court appeared to move toward a progressive stance when it handed
down its decision in Weber, which held that Title VII does not prohibit private,
voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. A company and the union
entered into a collective bargaining agreement which required the Company to,
among other things, reserve for Black employees 50 percent of the openings in
an in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of Black employees
matched the percentage of Blacks in the local labor force. Weber, a White
employee who was not selected for the program despite having more seniority
than the chosen Black employees, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the
affirmative action program violated Title VII. The Court held that affirmative
action is legal if: (1) its purposes mirror those of Title VII (i.e., ends
segregation); (2) it does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of White
employees (i.e., it does not require their discharge or bars them from
promotion); and (3) it is a temporary measure. Justice Brennan’s majority
opinion illustrates how a progressive ideology permits the Court to overlook
what may be explicit language in a statute limiting affirmative action. Arguing
that courts must look to Title VII’s “spirit” and historical context, he
determined that Title VII allows remedial affirmative action, despite language
in the statute indicating that it was not to be read as requiring racial
preferences.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 315.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980)68

In this case, the Court upheld, without a clear majority, the “minority
business enterprise” (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, which required that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for public
work projects must be used by contractors to procure services or supplies from
businesses owned predominately by “Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos, and Aluets.” Chief Justice Burger, whose opinion was joined
by two other justices, indicated that the special treatment of minority-owned
businesses was justified because Congress had determined that extensive
discrimination occurred within the construction industry, and that minority
businesses were disadvantaged by working capital, inadequate track record,
and other challenges. Burger was persuaded that Congress, as a branch of
government, was entitled to judicial deference. This decision would have great
significance for the Court’s later cases because it required a more conservative
Court to distinguish this case from those in which it rejected affirmative action
under similar facts.
5)

Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts (1984)69

The Court in Stotts overturned a lower court’s injunction preventing the
City of Memphis from laying off any Black firefighters during a budget
shortfall. White employees, who were laid off despite having more seniority
than the Black employees who were retained, sued along with their Union
under Title VII. The lower court issued the injunction pursuant to a consent
decree requiring the city to promote and hire Black firefighters. Justice White,
writing the majority opinion, argued that because the City laid off White
employees with more seniority than the Black employees who were retained, it
violated Title VII. This case illustrates how the Justices’ conservative ideology
allows them to ignore legal rule conventions. That is, the Court decided the
case despite the fact that the White firefighters who were laid off were
subsequently rehired; established rule conventions would have justified the
dismissal of such a case.
6)

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986)70

In one of the most important cases about affirmative action, the Court
invalidated a collective bargaining agreement that protected minority teachers
during layoffs. The agreement indicated that layoffs would be based primarily
on the seniority system, except that at no time should the percentage of
minority layoffs exceed the percentage of minorities employed at the time of
the layoff. The Board, following the agreement, laid off White teachers who
68. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
69. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
70. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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had more seniority than some Black teachers who were retained. The displaced
White teachers sued alleging that their layoffs violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Justice Powell, whose opinion was joined by three other justices,
claimed that there must be convincing evidence of prior discrimination before
a public employer can use limited racial classifications to remedy that
discrimination; “Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially-classified remedy.”71 Powell also rejected the
role model theory (i.e., minority teachers serve as role models for minority
children) because this would allow the racial classification long past the point
required by a legitimate state purpose, and it bears no relationship to
remedying prior discrimination.
7)

United States v. Paradise (1987)72

Paradise marked Justice Scalia’s entrance into the Court’s affirmative
action debates. In this case, the Court upheld a district court order imposing a
hiring quota on the Alabama Department of Public Safety. The order required
the Department to promote at least 50 percent of “qualified Black” troopers in
ranks that were less than 25 percent Black and where promotion practices
discriminated against Blacks. Justice Brennan’s opinion, which was joined by
three other justices, indicated that the judicial order was justified, even under
the strict scrutiny standard. There was in this case a compelling governmental
interest in eradicating the Department’s “pervasive, systemic, and obstinate”
discriminatory exclusion of Blacks. Remarkably, despite the fact that the
Justices acknowledged the evidence of the Department’s systemic
discrimination and refusal to abide by previous judicial orders, four Justices
dissented in this case, setting up the arguments for later cases that no form of
affirmative action is legal.
8)

Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987)73

The Court in this case upheld the Agency’s affirmative action plan for
hiring and promoting women and racial minorities. Johnson, a male candidate
for a road dispatcher position, was not promoted in favor of a woman, and he
sued under Title VII. Applying the principles of Weber, Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion argued that an employer may consider sex where there is a
“manifest imbalance” that reflected the underrepresentation of women in
“traditionally segregated job categories.” Furthermore, for Brennan, the plan
was temporary and did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of male
employees, create an absolute bar to their advancement, or set aside positions
for women.
71. Id. at 296.
72. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
73. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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City of Richmond v. Croson (1989)74

In a case involving government contracts and facts similar to those in
Fullilove, the Court invalidated the City’s Minority Business Plan. The Plan
required prime contractors to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar
amount of each contract to minority business enterprises (consisting, as in
Fullilove, of Black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut
citizens). Justice O’Connor’s court opinion, which was partially joined by four
other justices, purported to apply strict scrutiny and indicated that the City
failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest justifying the plan,
since the factual predicate supporting the plan did not establish the type of
“identified past discrimination” in the city’s construction industry that would
authorize race-based relief under the Equal Protection Clause. According to
O’Connor, a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in the
construction industry does not justify the use of unyielding racial quotas.
O’Connor distinguished Fullilove as standing for the principle of judicial
deference to acts of Congress. This case clearly illustrates how judges
manipulate legal principles to justify their ideological positions. This case,
based on facts very similar to those in Fullilove, would have allowed the Court
to follow the established legal convention of stare decisis.
10) Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
(1990)75
The Court upheld as constitutional the Commission’s policies to enhance
minority ownership. The Commission gave preferences to minority-owned
companies in awarding licenses, and its distress sale policies allowed
broadcasters whose qualifications came into question to transfer their licenses
to minority-owned companies in order to avoid a hearing. Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion indicated that a lower standard of justification is warranted
for benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress; these are
permissible to the extent they serve important governmental objectives and are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The Commission’s
policies are justified by the need to increase diversity in the airwaves. This
case included strong dissents, and it was later overturned when the make-up of
the Court became extremely politically-conservative.
11) Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña (1995)76
In a case with similar facts as those in Fullilove and Croson, the Court
struck down a financial incentive for federal contractors to hire minority
subcontractors. The plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, failed to receive a
74. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
75. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
76. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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subcontract despite submitting the lowest bid because it was not a certified
minority-owned company. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion argued that all
racial classifications imposed by state, local, or federal governments violate the
Fourteenth Amendment unless they survive strict scrutiny. Purporting to
clarify the Court’s inconsistencies in this area, O’Connor indicated that Metro
Broadcasting was overruled to the extent that it justifies a lower standard of
judicial review for affirmative action. This case illustrates how willing judges
are to ignore prior precedent to further their ideological arguments.77
Summary of the Cases
From a formal legal standpoint, the crux of the affirmative action cases is
that preferential treatment must be justified by “strict scrutiny,” which means
that such programs must be “justified by a compelling governmental interest”
and be “narrowly tailored to the achievement” of that interest.78 The Supreme
Court also has ruled that affirmative action can not be justified merely on the
basis of general “societal discrimination,” or when it is not justified by a
finding of prior discrimination identified “with some specificity.”79 It appears
that barring court-ordered affirmative action to remedy intentional
discrimination, public agencies may not attempt to remedy the effects of a
historically-validated subordination of certain social groups by others. These
cases reveal that the Court, especially in its later make-up, treats all racial
classifications as invidious discrimination, disconnecting state action from its
historical and political contexts. In refusing to conceive of affirmative action as
a corrective, compensatory, or re-distributive remedy, the Court has assumed a
definition of discrimination that focuses on the isolated acts of prejudiced
individuals rather than the more covert but insidious forms of institutional
discrimination.
From a critical legal standpoint, the cases show how the justices
manipulate apparently neutral and well-established legal doctrine (e.g., legal
precedent, evidentiary rules) to justify their ideological positions, and also how
conservative ideological positions predominate on the Supreme Court. The
later cases, particularly, indicate that the Court has limited state’s ability to
resort to antidiscrimination principles to remedy the effects of past
discrimination, while concurrently expanding the availability of those
77. I note here the case of Taxman v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 91
F.3d 1457 (3d Cir. 1996), which was settled after the Court heard oral arguments and which
might have shed further light on the current’s Court’s ideological stance. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Board violated Title VII when it laid off a White
teacher and maintained a Black teacher. Id. The teachers were equal in all relevant ways except
race. The court, arguing that it was following Weber and Johnson, indicated that unless
affirmative action is remedial in nature, it violated Title VII.
78. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
79. Id. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 74.
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principles for White litigants challenging that remedy. For example, the Court
refuses to permit states to follow the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment by
instituting remedies for the lingering effects of their prior discriminatory
practices, but it allows White plaintiffs to use that Amendment to challenge
those remedies. In any sense, the Court acts as an ideological and repressive
state apparatus on behalf of those who benefit from its decisions. With a
conservative ideology, however, the Court serves the particular interests of
individual White plaintiffs. But more generally, the Court serves the interests
of employers, who now need not be concerned with affirmative action and can
pursue their corporate interests accordingly.
As “texts” these cases reveal important aspects about the social world of
the past 20 years or so. The cases reflect how a particular racial ideology
functions to make the outcomes of these decisions “obvious.” For example, the
discourse of color-blindness shapes the meaning of affirmative action as that
which forces the return to state-sanctioned discrimination. Furthermore, the
cases reflect the continued existence of pervasive notions of racial (and gender)
inferiority. Thus, Whites feel compelled to challenge those racial preferences
from which they did not benefit as violating common-sense standards of merit,
seniority, and the racial hierarchy that sustains those standards. It is to these
“textual” aspects of the cases that I direct the rest of the essay.
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION “STORIES”
The cases discussed in this essay reveal the predominance of six “stories”
used repeatedly by the Supreme Court justices to justify their decisions for or
against affirmative action. The use of stories is not troublesome per se. As
LaRue explained, such stories are necessary for persuasion.80 But, as White
indicated, legal stories constitute community;81 thus, when these stories justify
decisions against racial minorities, they constitute a racially-oppressive
community and preserve it through repressive means. Furthermore, because
these judicial stories takes place within an ideological state apparatus, they
interpellate individuals into a racial hierarchy and make it seem “obvious” that
such an hierarchy exists.
Social convention require that judges interpret laws. Judges, particularly
the Supreme Court justices, are “authorities of legal discourses.” In other
words, judges have authority over what can be spoken or written in law and
how this is to be done. Since judges have authority over legal discourse, they
can influence its “truth.” Furthermore, judges can ensure the enforcement of
their “truths” elsewhere through their sovereign power to initiate the repressive
forces of other state apparatuses (e.g., the police, the prisons). But because
judges have no actual control over other apparatuses, and their decisions are
80. LARUE, supra note 13, at 8.
81. WHITE, supra note 7, at 71.
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subject to appeal, they must persuade others that their opinions are correct and
legitimate.
Judges persuade in similar ways to that of other political actors. Stone
argued that political actors often use “causal stories,” with images of “cause,
blame, and responsibility,” to gain support for their side.82 In other words,
these individuals compose stories that describe harms and difficulties, attribute
them to the actions of other individuals or organizations, and, thereby, claim
the right to invoke government power to stop the harm. Furthermore, political
actors manipulate symbolic devices, all the while making it seem as if they are
simply describing facts. The stories discussed in this essay appear as causal
stories.
The Stories
Freeman noted about the Supreme Court that its stories are presented to the
public as “melodramatic media distillations.”83 The use of melodrama is
effective, especially when combined with causal stories. Rosaldo argued that
narrators use melodrama in cultural texts to justify their moral stances.84 He
argued that narrators place characters at the point of intersection of primal
ethical forces, and that narrators present human events with a
distinctive moral intensity that follows the logic of the excluded middle; it
portrays conflicts between absolute good and absolute evil. The earnest
exaggeration in such narratives evokes the readers’ partisan responses. The
narrator assumes a moral stance toward the protagonists, the protagonists feel
persecuted, and the readers react with horror, panic, or sympathetic pity. These
dramas move readers to take sides in a battle between virtue and vice.85

I relate a melodrama of my own in this essay. My story is that the Supreme
Court justices use in the affirmative action cases six melodramatic causal
stories, and although these stories are contested, they ultimately constitute in
language, ideology, and practice a racially-oppressive social structure and
enact against historically-subordinated groups (especially African Americans)
a state-sanctioned violence.
1)

The Story of the “Impartial Rule Applier”

All cases probably illustrate the existence of this common fiction: the
neutral, objective, and impartial judge who mechanically applies the rules of
the rational legislature acting in accordance with the will of the people. The

82. Deborah Stone, Casual Stories and the Formation of Political Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q.
281, 282 (1989).
83. Freeman, supra note 51, at 286.
84. RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 138
(1989).
85. Id.
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affirmative action cases, however, revealed that this fiction was manipulated to
justify a particular stance on race. Consider Justice Powell’s comments in
Bakke in which he argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause can
not be tied to the “transitory considerations” of historical discrimination:
[The] mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and
social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the
Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its coherent
interpretation. In expounding the Constitution, the Court’s role is to discern
‘principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community
and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level
of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place.’86

Powell argues that the judge must remain above the “shifting” political
considerations and historical claims for resources. The judge in his story must
remain impartial, apolitical, and ahistorical, and instead “discern” absolute
principles that are not subject to the political considerations of a “particular
time and space.” This story fails to account for how unlikely it might be for
anyone to be able to “discern absolute principles” unclouded by ideological
perspectives. It fails to account as well for how the very notion of an impartial
judge is itself one of a number of possible “pragmatic political judgments of a
particular time and place.”
Powell’s story, furthermore, belies his ultimate position. Later in the case,
Powell explained why the traditional concern with African Americans in equal
protection analysis need not be considered when Whites claim such protection:
Because the landmark decisions in this area arose in response to the continued
exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American society, they could
characterized as involving discrimination by the “majority” white race against
the Negro minority. But they need not be read as depending upon that
characterization for their results.87

Thus, Powell’s story argues on the one hand for adherence to “universal
principles” of equality, and for a judge that is above shifting political
judgments, yet he himself refused to apply the legal precedents (and common
historical understanding) of the Equal Protection Clause. Powell uses the story
of the impartial judge, but then manipulates it to further his ideological stance
against affirmative action.
This discussion, however, is not intended to imply that only politicallyconservative judges manipulate the story of the impartial rule-applier. Consider
Justice Brennan’s use of the story to justify his pro-affirmative-action stance in
Weber:

86. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 294. Note the interesting use of inverted commas around the term “majority,”
perhaps revealing an ahistorical perspective to race relations.
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The prohibition against racial discrimination in 703(a) and (d) of Title VII
must therefore be read against the background of the legislative history of Title
VII and the historical context from which the Act arose. . . . Examination of
those sources makes clear that an interpretation of the sections that forbade all
race-conscious affirmative action would ‘bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute’ and must be rejected.88

Brennan’s story asserts as if there could be no question that his position is
correct, or as if his judge can impartially discern the legislature’s intent in
formulating an interpretation of Title VII. His story, however, unlike Powell’s,
constitutes, following White, a “community” with a history, one that
establishes laws to serve higher purposes than merely those that celebrate
principles without a social context, without a community. Contrast the kind of
“community” constituted by Justice Rehnquist in his use of the story in Weber:
As if [the majority opinion’s that Title VII’s legislative history justifies
affirmative action] not enough to make a reasonable observer question this
Court’s adherence to the oft-stated principle that our duty is to construe rather
than rewrite legislation . . . the Court also seizes upon 703(j) of Title VII as an
independent, or at least partially independent, basis for its holding. . . . Thus,
by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes,
but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory
language, ‘uncontradicted’ legislative history, and uniform precedent in
concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider race in making
employment decisions.89

Justice Rehnquist’s story stresses his understanding of the formalistic
principles of Title VII to justify his anti-affirmative-action stance. Rehnquist’s
story of the impartial judge not only establishes a community of laws (not
individuals), but also implies that the majority’s, not his, opinion is motivated
by political considerations. At any rate, the story of the impartial rule-applier
characterizes most cases, although some judges (e.g., Rehnquist) adhere to the
formal principles of law and others (e.g., Brennan) are willing to apply rules
that exist outside of those formal principles (e.g., legislative intent, history).
What appears to fuel the story of the impartial rule-applier is the
ideological force of the “model of formality.” Kennedy postulated that our
liberal theory of justice involves a model of formality which has three
premises: (1) the legal system serves the conflicting ends of the legislature; (2)
legislative rules are produced by a rational law-making process; and (3) courts
mechanically apply these rules to cases presented to them.90 The notion that
judges are impartial “rule-appliers” responds to what Kennedy defined as the

88. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-2 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 221-2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: JURISPRUDENCE 495-542,
502-3 (Jules Coleman ed., 1994).
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problem of justice in the liberal state—that the power to invoke state force
must come from the legitimate representative of the citizenry. Thus, legislators,
embodying the “legal sovereign,” make rules applying the various situations in
which state coercion might be used, and judges impartially apply those rules,
acting as agents of the sovereign.
Kennedy understood, however, that judges can not be merely rule-appliers.
They often must choose between rules, and make rules when none appears, to
govern the disposition of many complex cases. In reality, what happens is that
judges choose among rules, but they justify these choices with the model of
formality—having at their disposal the quip that their actions, if unjustified,
can always be reversed by the legal sovereign (the legislature). But Kennedy
notes that the “judge can not claim that legislative acquiescence legitimizes his
action because he himself creates, through his decision of particular cases, the
situation from which will emerge an as yet indeterminate constellation of
legislative power.”91 In other words, the judge affects a private outcome, which
in turn automatically reacts back upon the political struggle by creating
interests that seek to continue or modify the rule and gives the legislators
whatever resources are necessary to produce decisions.
The model of formality is ingrained in legal jurisprudence, and the
ideological positions of conservatism and progressivism determine whether
formalism serves or hinders social justice. Regarding affirmative action,
conservatives and progressives disagree not only about the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also the meaning of “equality” embodied in that
amendment.92 Progressives, such as Brennan, support a “substantive”
understanding of equality; conservatives, such as Rehnquist, support a
“formal” understanding of equality. In essence, conservatives believe that
equality means that individuals should not be irrationally discriminated against
by state officials, and that all racial classifications must be irrational because
they breach the formal mandates of the constitution. Progressives, on the other
hand, believe that equality means affirmatively breaking down the hierarchic
domination of some social groups by others, and racial classifications can be
constitutional if they correct the maldistributions of social power, wealth, and
prestige. Conservative perspectives, however, are predominant in the current
Supreme Court, and they pose great risk to the gains made within the last thirty
years by racial minorities (and other subordinated groups).
To promote this conservatism in the face of other stories (e.g., those of
slavery, Jim Crow, and the civil rights movement), the story of the impartial
rule-applier effectively must misappropriate historical stories and important
symbols of racial justice. For example, Judge Hand, who vehemently criticized
affirmative action, manipulated the story of Brown v. Board of Education to
91. Id. at 529.
92. West, supra note 56, at 643.
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assert that “beginning with Brown . . . judges are free to substitute their own
views or those of social engineers . . . with the Constitution cast aside, the new
clerisy has usurped legislative power, calling into question the continuance of
constitutional democracy, in which law flows from the people expressing their
will through elected officials.”93 Hand’s story not only adheres strictly to the
model of formality, but in his melodrama Brown and affirmative action
threaten the continuance of constitutional democracy—they oppose the
Constitution. His causal story sets up a harm (to our government by racial
preferences) caused by certain individuals and groups (those who press for
racial preferences, and, perhaps, those who benefit from them), and gives the
courts (and himself as judge) the right to end this threat.
What should be most troublesome for progressively-minded individuals is
the effectiveness of the impartial rule-applier story in promoting conservatism
by masking it with unquestioned legal and social conventions. It operates as a
causal story with “bite” (i.e., with the power to repress resistance through
conventions). The insidiousness of this rhetoric—and the ideology of formality
supporting it—lies in its “normalcy.” The effectiveness of this story is,
following Althusser, its “obviousness,” and its easy conversion into
institutional practices that serve those who might benefit from such ideology—
certainly the plaintiffs in affirmative action cases, but also those individuals
with the political clout to initiate the, per Kennedy, “constellation of legislative
power” on their own behalf (such as, e.g., the Center for Individual Rights).94
2)

The Story of the “Intentional Discriminator”

The story of the “intentional discriminator” is common in discrimination
cases and was prevalent in the affirmative action cases discussed in this essay.
Consider Justice Powell’s reasoning in Wygant for rejecting the Board’s claim
that it was using affirmative action to remedy its past discrimination:
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting the layoff provision
was to remedy prior discrimination against minorities by the Jackson School
District in hiring teachers. . . . But the courts concluded that any statistical
disparities were the result of the general societal discrimination, not of prior
discrimination by the Board.95

Contrast Powell’s comments with those of Chief Justice Burger, who argued in
Fullilove that Congress justified its affirmative action despite its failure to
identify intentional discrimination:
Congress had before it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked
disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to minority business
93. W. Brevard Hand, Affirmative Action: La Mort De La Republique? A Cry from the
Wilderness, 48 ALA. L. REV. 799, 807 (1997).
94. See supra note 37.
95. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 278 (Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
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enterprises. This disparity was considered to result not from any lack of
capable and qualified minority businesses, but from the existence and
maintenance of barriers to competitive access which had their roots in racial
and ethnic discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any
intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct.96

Both Powell and Burger identify intentional discrimination as the standard for
determining not only liability but also remediation. But while Powell used the
story of the intentional discriminator to justify an anti-affirmative action
stance, Burger, surprisingly, used it identify another legitimate standard for
determining liability and remediation in the affirmative action cases.
The notion of “intention” in law may be premised on what Kelman
identified as a view of “human action in phenomenological, forward-looking,
free-will—oriented terms, emphasizing the indeterminacy of action, and,
correlatively, the ethnical responsibilities of actors.”97 Racial discrimination,
given its moral implications, is linked closely with intention—with a mental
act. Pilon argued explicitly that “Discrimination is a mental act. . . . [It] is the
reason [that] one refuses to associate [with another] . . . [And] that leads us to
say that he discriminated against (or in favor of) another.”98
Intention is inextricably linked to the notion of “moral responsibility.” To
believe that someone is morally responsible for an act, he or she must seen as
the source of his or her actions.99 Following this line of thinking, in order for
one to be held morally responsible for the racial domination of others, one
must first exercise some type of “free will.” These notions of free will,
intention, and moral responsibility likely are informed by what Kant’s
identified as the “transcendental idea of freedom,” or belief that the “causality
of freedom is not in turn subject, according to the law of nature, to another
cause that determines it as regards time.”100 This means that in order to
attribute moral responsibility to an individual, those doing the attribution must
first determine that the individual’s actions can not be deemed to be caused by
anything other than that person’s intention and free will.
The story of the intentional discriminator is reinforced by the dominant
liberal discourse of the free and self-determining individual and the ideology of
individualism that such discourse furthers.101 This discourse assumes,
following John Locke, a “state of perfect freedom,” in which individuals order
their actions, and dispose of their possessions as they think fit, “within the
96. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (Burger, C.J.) (emphasis added).
97. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86 (1987).
98. Roger Pilon, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Freedom: Sorting Out the Issues,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 782 (1996).
99. Derk Pereboom, Introduction to FREE WILL, vii (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997).
100. Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, in FREE WILL 86-7 (Derk Pereboum ed.,
1997).
101. WEEDON, supra note 1, at 5.
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bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will
of any other man.”102 This understanding allows individuals to see the social
world, and the relations between individuals, as governed by “contract;” in
other words, individuals are presumed to be able (provided they are mentally
and physically capable) to negotiate with others to what extent they will adhere
to others’ wishes. But social structures are there, obdurate and unavoidable.
The story of the intentional discriminator, therefore, and the notions of free
will, moral responsibility, and individualism that sustain it, justifies existing
social structures because it constitutes a world where actions are determined by
free will and not by deterministic laws.
The story of the intentional discriminatory, however, is contradicted by
stories that de-emphasize indeterminism. Kelman noted these kinds of
contradictions in legal jurisprudence, particularly the contradiction between
intentionalistic and deterministic discourses. Intentionalistic discourse assumes
that human action is the product of a self-determining will. Such discourse
deems the individual as intending his or her actions, and thus, it justifies the
allocation of reward and blame in most cases. It purports also to explain the
private world (that governed by contract), which is seen as reflecting the uncoerced intentions of individuals. Deterministic discourse, conversely, assumes
that human conduct is the outcome of existing structures. Such discourse
acknowledges how individual preferences and choices are constrained by
social structures, and thus, individuals are neither to be respected nor
condemned.103 The intentionalistic discourse is privileged in law.104
The departure from intentionalistic discourse is rare because intention is so
ingrained in our predominant liberal discourse. Freeman argued that
antidiscrimination law is “hopelessly embedded in the ‘perpetrator
perspective.’”105 This perspective sees racial discrimination as “actions;” in
other words, racial oppression is deemed the result of the isolated acts of
individuals acting outside of society’s rules or conventions. The objective of
antidiscrimination law under this perspective, therefore, is to eliminate the
“act,” or to punish the intentional “actor.” Because discrimination is seen as
resulting from the intentional transgressions of individuals, courts are easily
able to allocate reward and blame to plaintiffs and defendants. The perpetrator
perspective appears to inform the intentionalistic discourse of the cases I
discussed in this essay, and justified the courts’ “punishment” of the public
102. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in PRINCETON READINGS IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: ESSENTIAL TEXTS SINCE PLATO 243-79, at 243-44 (Mitchell Cohen & Nicole
Fermon eds., 1996).
103. KELMAN, supra note 97, at 86-113.
104. By “privileged” I refer to Kelman’s notion that privileged arguments are presumed to
govern in most cases, departures, though permitted, are deemed exceptions requiring special
justification. Id. at 4.
105. Freeman, supra note 5, at 29.
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defendants for their intentional discrimination against Whites (e.g., the
University of California in Bakke; the City of Richmond in Croson, the School
Board in Wygant, etc.).
But intentionalistic discourse often is contested (e.g., Burger’s opinion in
Fullilove). Note how Justice Marshall in Bakke explicitly departs from
intentionalistic discourse in favor of a deterministic view of discrimination:
In declining to so hold [that a class-based remedy for discrimination is
permissible], today’s judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years
Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely
because of the color of their skins. It is unnecessary in the 20th-century
America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of
racial discrimination; the racism in our society has been so pervasive that
none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact.106

Marshall’s melodrama rejects the argument that it is necessary to prove that
African Americans are victimized by discrimination, or, consequently, that
Whites intentionally enact that discrimination. Marshall’s “20th Century
America” is inherently discriminatory, and no one can escape (or ignore) this.
The story of the intentional discriminator, though prevalent in affirmative
action cases, is not as “obvious” as the story of the impartial rule-applier, and
that might be because other stories provide convincing contradictions.
Marshall’s story, for example, corresponds to what Freeman’s identified in
antidiscrimination law as the “victim perspective,” which deems
discriminations as “conditions,” rather than “actions.”107 This perspective
considers how social conditions are experienced by racial minorities. In this
regard, Freeman’s and Marshall’s stories support those told by, for example,
critical race theorists, who argue that racism is embedded in social structures
and can not be attributed easily to intentional discrimination.108
The stories told by Marshall, Freeman, and the critical race theorists, are
potentially effective contradictions to the story of the intentional discriminator
because they are supported by many social scientists. For example, Blauner
argued that racial oppression is not simply the result of prejudice; it is
institutionalized in bureaucratic processes:
The processes that maintain domination—control of whites over nonwhites—
are built into the major institutions. These institutions either exclude or restrict
the participation of racial groups by procedures that have become
conventional, part of the bureaucratic system of rules and regulations. Thus

106. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J.) (emphasis added).
107. Freeman, supra note 5, at 29.
108. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2331-35 (1989). See also CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
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there is little need for prejudice as a motivating force. Because this is true, the
distinction between racism as an objective phenomenon, located in the actual
existence of domination and hierarchy, and racism’s subjective concomitants
of prejudice and other motivations and feelings is a basic one.109

The stories that contradict the “intentional discriminator” do not presume the
necessity of discriminatory intent in order to allocate blame; they would
assume the existence of racism and the historically-validated subordination of
racial minorities that results from it. Those contrary stories do not privilege
evidence of intentional wrong-doing; they privilege evidence of the effects of
academic and employment practices on racial minorities.
Perhaps because deterministic discourse strongly counteracts the story of
the intentional discriminator, the story is manipulated by conservative judges
to fit situations where affirmative action would clearly be warranted under
intentionalistic discourse. For example, consider these two apparently
contradictory stories told by Justice O’Connor—the first is from Wygant and
stresses evidence of intentional discrimination to justify affirmative action; the
second is from Paradise and requires her to justify her stance against
affirmative action in the face of such intentional discrimination:
The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not focus on the School
Board’s unquestionably compelling interest in remedying its apparent prior
discrimination when evaluating the constitutionality of the challenged layoff
provision. Instead, both courts reasoned that the goals of remedying ‘societal
discrimination’ and providing ‘role models’ were sufficiently important to
withstand equal protection scrutiny. I agree with the plurality [opinion] that a
governmental agency’s interest in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that is,
discrimination not traceable to its own actions, can not be deemed sufficiently
compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny. I also concur in
the plurality’s assessment that the use by the courts below of a ‘role model’
theory to justify the conclusion that this plan had a legitimate remedial purpose
was in error. Thus, in my view, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
clearly erred in relying on these purposes and in failing to give greater
attention to the School Board’s asserted purpose of rectifying its own apparent
discrimination.110
One can not read the record in this case without concluding that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety had undertaken a course of action that amounted
to pervasive, systemic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct. . . . [But] racially
preferential treatment of nonvictims . . . should only be ordered “where such
remedies are truly necessary.” . . . If strict scrutiny is to have any meaning,
therefore, a promotion goal must have a closer relationship to the percentages
of blacks eligible for promotions. . . . But the protection of the rights of
nonminority workers demands that a racial goal not substantially exceed the

109. ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA 9-10 (1972).
110. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288-9 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work
force absent a compelling justification.111

O’Connor’s story in Wygant illustrates intentionalistic discourse; she refused to
support the School Board’s affirmative action program because she believed
that it was not based on a prior finding of “[the Board’s] own apparent”
discrimination. The following year, however, she refused to support an
affirmative action remedy in Paradise, even though the remedy was based on
prior judicial findings of the Department’s “pervasive, systemic, and obstinate”
discrimination. In Paradise, though her story used overtly intentionalistic
language, it implied a kind of determinism; that is, she appeared to be saying
that despite the Department’s blatant discrimination, the eligibility of the Black
officers for promotion must be carefully examined—as if the department’s
actions had nothing (or little) to do with this lack of eligibility. It appears that
for O’Connor, the story of the intentional discriminator, and those that
contradict it, served her purpose—she used “intention” to justify overturning
affirmative action in Wygant and downplayed it in attempting to do the same in
Paradise. Yet, she used very “factual” language, fine distinctions, and legal
nuances. But the fact of the matter is that these stories can not be reconciled
with each other. She manipulated the story of the intentional discriminator to
correspond with her ideological beliefs.
The judges’ use of the story to further an anti-affirmative-action stance
should make progressive scholars take heed of Flagg’s argument that the
discriminatory intent requirement reflects the way Whites view racial
discrimination.112 Flagg argued that: (1) Whites view “intent” as an essential
element of racial harm, but non-Whites do not; (2) Whites have more
confidence in racial neutrality than do non-Whites; and (3) the intent’s
requirement’s failure to effectuate substantive racial justice is indicative of
Whites’ complacency with, or commitment to, the racial status quo in which
they hold the advantage.113 Blauner made a similar argument when he asserted
that Whites and people of color have different views of discrimination: Whites
define racism in terms of overt individual acts of discrimination that were
common before the 1960s; people of color’s definition of racism encompasses
the “atmospheric” racism of a social situation, and they see society, or a
particular aspect of it, as racist simply because they do not share equally in the
distribution of power.114 Blauner argued that because Whites see racism

111. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 196-9 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
112. Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958-9 (1993).
113. Id.
114. Bob Blauner, ‘But Things Are Much Worse for the Negro People’: Race and Radicalism
in My Life and Work, in A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS RESEARCH: FIRST-GENERATION
RECOLLECTIONS 1-36, at 30-1 (John H. Stanfield II ed., 1993).
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differently, and are turned off by the over-heated racism discourse, they have
come to see the “reverse discrimination” of affirmative action as the most
important form of racism.115
Flagg’s and Blauner’s arguments should be modified to reflect a
predominant ideological imperative that transcends Whiteness or race: the
political-liberal-humanist discourse of individualism, and the notions of selfdetermination, free will, and moral responsibility that furthers it. Racial
oppression rarely is seen by those who control the legal apparatus—usually
Whites but not necessarily so—as structural, ideological, or normative.
O’Connor’s stories, therefore, may be inconsistent in the sense that internally,
linguistically, they are contradictory, but they might express as well the
external consistency and pervasiveness of liberal-humanist discourse.
O’Connor’s stories illustrate how judges confront the contradiction in such
liberal discourse: that between an “obvious” belief in self-determinism and the
reality of long-standing racial disparity. Thus, her story in Wygant was simply
about intention (i.e., the lack of evidence of the Board’s prior discrimination),
but her story in Paradise, which could not negate the evidence of such
intention, hinged on the appropriateness of the remedy (i.e., quotas are illegal
even with intentional discrimination). Because both of O’Connor’s stories in
this sense support the ideology of individualism (and the interests served by it),
they were, perhaps, complimentary.
The story of the intentional discriminator, and its manipulation to further
the ideology of individualism, will ensure that racial justice is never reached.
The story allows courts to maintain a racial hierarchy through repressive means
(e.g., by invalidating affirmative action and initiating the processes of violence
that punish those who fail to abide by their rulings) and through ideology (e.g.,
individualism). In other words, the story of the intentional discriminator
constitutes a world where individuals (a) intend their actions, (b) racial
discrimination is rare (because it is often not intended), and (c) overt forms of
discrimination are more blameworthy than covert forms. But all ideology,
following Althusser, functions on behalf of the dominant classes; thus, it is
important to identify in these stories who or what benefits from individualism.
In one sense, the White (or male) plaintiffs benefit because they can easily
point to intention; public and (especially) priviate employers might benefit as
well because they need not be concerned with the disparate impact of their
corporate practices on White women and racial minorities; but ultimately,
Whites, men, and the wealthy benefit because the story of the intentional
discriminator constitutes a community where institutional arrangements that
maintain social hierarchies are deemed the “nature of things.”

115. Id. at 31.
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The Story of the “Stigmatized Minority”

The story of the “stigmatized minority” is pervasive in affirmative action
cases. For example, consider the various elaborations of this story in the cases
discussed in this essay:
Preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that
certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based
on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.116
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.117

The story of the stigmatized minority is actually common in affirmative action
discourse, often supported by social science research118 and “legitimized” by
certain members of racial minority groups.119 The story works in
contradictions. It conjures up racial inferiority, while at the same time
contradicting it. It uses the symbols it purports to reject, but in doing so,
reinforces those very symbols. In other words, this story claims to reject the
notion that racial minorities are inferior, but all the while it keeps the notion of
racial inferiority prominent in discourse.
The story of the stigmatized minority also is a significant causal story; it
allocates blame. Consider Justice Thomas’ story of the stigmatized minority in
Adarand:
Unquestionably, ‘invidious racial discrimination is an engine of repression.’ It
is also true that ‘remedial’ racial preferences may reflect ‘a desire to foster
equality in society.’ But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its
unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination. So-called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that
because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities can not
compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such
programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by
government’s use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adapt an attitude
that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences. . . . In my mind, government-sponsored
racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as

116. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
117. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J.) (emphasis added).
118. See e.g., William M. Banks, Afro-American Scholars in the University: Roles and
Conflicts, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 325, 333 (1984).
119. See e.g., Thomas Sowell, We’ve More Than Our Quota of Quotas, in IN FROM
DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA (Ron Takaki ed., 2d
ed. 1994); STEELE, supra note 47, at 116-8.
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discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance it is racial
discrimination, plain and simple.120

Thomas’ story in one sense explains why affirmative action is detrimental to
racial minorities. In this regard, the story puts forward the judge as a
“protector;” one who guards against the debilitating effects of the stigma. But
the latter part of his story does something else; it implies blame. In other
words, the stigmatized minority is not only made inferior by affirmative action
but also becomes “dependent” on government, then feels “entitled” to
government benefits. The stigmatized minority, therefore, moves from
victimized to victimizing by expecting (and receiving) entitlements (a “free
handout” so to speak). The minority then causes the very stigma imposed on
him or her. Rather than questioning the premise of the stigma, Thomas’ story
both protects and blames racial minorities. His causal story, therefore,
identified the harm and cause as the same.
Thomas’ causal story is subtle, but Justice Kennedy’s causal story of
stigma in Metro Broadcasting is much more explicit, indicating that Whites are
also victims:
Although the majority disclaims it, the FCC policy seems based on the
demeaning notion that members of the defined racial group ascribe to certain
‘minority views’ that must be different from those of other citizens. Special
preferences can also foster the view that members of the favored groups are
inherently less able to compete on their own. . . . The perceptions of the
excluded class must also be weighed, . . . [since] there is the danger that the
‘stereotypical thinking’ that prompt policies such as the FCC rules here,
‘stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial
discrimination.’ . . . Until the Court is candid about the existence of stigma
imposed by the racial preferences on both affected classes, candid about the
‘animosity and discontent’ they create, and open about defending a theory that
explains why the cost of this stigma is worth bearing and why it can consist
with the Constitution, no basis can be shown for today’s casual abandonment
of strict scrutiny.121

Kennedy appears to equate the stigmatized minority with the “stigmatized
discriminator,” a rhetorical tactic that may create a White victim in a doublesense: a victim of the actual effects of racial preferences and a victim of the
symbolic presence of the beneficiaries of affirmative action. In other words,
not only will Whites be denied, say, admissions or employment offers because
of institutions’ use of affirmative action, but the presence of affirmative-action
beneficiaries will symbolize that Whites have been unfairly charged with past
racial discrimination. In Kennedy’s causal story, therefore, racial minorities are
to be doubly-blamed.

120. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 240-1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
121. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636-7 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Why might this story be so pervasive in affirmative action discourse? Why
does it work? The answer may lie in the way the discourse of stigma is realized
in social practices. Goffman defined a person with a stigma as “possessing an
attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons
available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind—in the extreme, a person
who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak.”122 Goffman identified
three types of stigma: (1) the abominations of the body (e.g., physical
deformities), (2) the blemishes of individual character (e.g., weak will,
treacherousness, homosexuality), and (3) the tribal stigmas of race, nation, and
religion. Those who do not depart negatively from particular expectations are,
on the other hand, called “normals.” Goffman postulated that the term “stigma”
and its synonyms conceal a “double perspective:”
Does the stigmatized individual assume his differentness is known about
already or is evident on the spot, or does he assume it is neither known about
by those present nor immediately perceivable by them? In the first case one
deals with the plight of the discredited, in the second with that of the
discreditable.123

In one sense, the story of the stigmatized minority encompasses most racial
minorities in academic and professional settings: those individuals who benefit
from racial preferences are discredited, and those who do not are discreditable
(actually, perhaps only African Americans, Latinos/as, and Native Americans).
In another sense, the story encompasses all racial minorities in all settings:
they discredited because they depart from the “normal.” The story works
because it reinforces the stigma, keeps it in discourse. Goffman asserted that
the stigmatization of racial groups functions as a means of removing them
from various avenues of competition.124 Crenshaw and Higginbotham
explained how economic and political gains have accrued from the
stigmatization of African Americans.125 Thus, the story of the “stigma” of
affirmative action might further two related practices: ensuring that racial
minorities are kept out of competition with Whites for all social positions, or
maintaining a racially-stratified society by limiting them to certain types of
activities.

122. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3
(1963).
123. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 139.
125. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM:
RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996).
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But if all stories are subject to contradiction, why does this story pervades
the affirmative action discourse, even the narratives of progressive judges?126
Goffman theorized that the stigma a person possesses relates to a “category . . .
available for him to be.” Thus, as with any discourse, the stigma needs to be
realized in institutional practices to be effective.127 Social and historical
contexts are crucial for defining and maintaining stigmas. In academia, for
example, the ideology of individual merit is important, and this ideology is
realized in institutional practices that define merit by standardized admissions
tests, grade point averages, the “quality” of prior schooling, the taking of
certain types of courses, and so forth. Students of color, who generally do not
do as well as Whites on these criteria, are presumed to be unqualified. Thus,
the story of the stigmatized minority has a “truth” to it; that is, when judged by
these notions of individual merit alone, affirmative action will mean that
students of color (generally) will have less merit than White students
(generally). The academic practices, therefore, plays a crucial role in creating
and maintaining the stigma of affirmative action and, thus, they ensure the
effectiveness (and apparent unassailability) of the story of the stigmatized
minority.
The story of the stigmatized minority in affirmative action discourse can be
contradicted, however, if one follows Goffman’s definition of the stigma.
Goffman argued that stigmas relate to physical, character, or tribal attributes;
thus, “affirmative action,” as the institutional practice that it is, can not be
stigmatizing because it is not an attribute that one possesses. The story,
therefore, can be contradicted as internally incoherent. More important, the
story’s focus on affirmative action really is a proxy for the actual, but
considerably more uncomfortable, stigmatic attribute—race. Affirmative
action discourse is framed often in racial terms. Though White women,
physically-disabled individuals, and others might benefit from affirmative
action, they are not stigmatized by it—rather, they are not stigmatized by it in
the same way that are African Americans, and, perhaps, Latinos/as and Native
Americans. In the context of affirmative action, race is the referenced attribute,
and race plays upon certain norms (such as merit).
The “stigma” of affirmative action can not be disassociated from the norms
of the social world (i.e., race and merit). As Goffman suggested, to understand
“differentness,” one should look to the:
126. For example, Justice Douglas in DeFunis, who argued that the LSAT was
discriminatory, nevertheless asserted that, “A segregated admissions process creates suggestions
of stigma and caste no less than a segregated classroom, and in the end may produce that result
despite its contrary intentions. One other assumption must be clearly disapproved: that blacks or
browns cannot make it on their individual merit. That is a stamp of inferiority that a State is not
permitted to place on any lawyer.” DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. See WEEDON, supra note 1, at 104-14 (for an accessible discussion of the power of
discourses).
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ordinary. . . . It can be assumed that a necessary condition for social life is the
sharing of a single set of normative expectations by all participants, the norms
being sustained in part because of being incorporated. When a rule is broken
restorative measures will occur; the damaging is terminated and the damage
repaired, whether by control agencies or by the culprit himself.128

In this way, the “normal” and “stigmatized” are an inextricable part of
normative processes of social life—one comes with the other. The normal and
the stigmatized, however, are, following Goffman, not persons but
perspectives, “generated in social situations during mixed contacts by the
virtue of the unrealized norms that are likely to play upon the encounter.”129 In
other words, these social categories are enforced locally at the level of social
interaction by norms. The story of the stigmatized minority, therefore, may not
originate structurally in courts, but locally in norms.
The “norms” in this society are premised on social hierarchies. Balibar
noted the “latent hierarchy” in universal principles of human behavior.130
Historically, this hierarchy has favored Whites over non-Whites (as well as,
men over women, the wealthy over the poor, etc.). If the traditional notion of
merit is the “universal,” then it creates both the “normal” (i.e., those who score
well on standardized tests, those who went to the best schools) and the
“stigmatized” (i.e., those who do not do well on appropriate criteria).
Furthermore, if Crenshaw is correct that Whiteness is associated with
“normatively positive characteristics,”131 then the normal is White and the
stigmatized is non-White. Together, these norms create this story: the
attainment of merit can be assumed for Whites but not for certain racial
minorities. The story of the stigmatized minority works because it plays upon
such norms. This story, however, is incoherent in the associations it creates
between race and affirmative action; rather, the proper association is between
race and norms. The rhetorical tactic of tying stigma to affirmative action, at
any rate, has political benefits for those who benefit from the stigma of race: it
forces racial minorities (and White women to some extent) to defend their
presence in the professional workforce or on college campuses, rather than
collectively attacking the norms and practices that lead to discrimination.
That the affirmative action discourse focuses on race categories, especially
that of African Americans, leads to a final but important point. The stigma of
African American racial group membership was prominent in the affirmative
action cases. Despite the stereotypes, and consequent discrimination, faced by
other racial and ethnic minorities—for example, “Latinos/as are lazy,” “Asian

128. GOFFMAN, supra note 122, at 127.
129. Id. at 138.
130. Etienne Balibar, Racism as Universalism, in MASSES, CLASSES, IDEAS: STUDIES ON
POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY BEFORE AND AFTER MARX 197 (James Swenson trans., 1994).
131. Crenshaw, supra note 125, at 113.
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Americans are the model minority”—African Americans may be particularly
stigmatized by race. Recently, eugenics has resurfaced, especially since the
release of books such as The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in
American Life.132 Furthermore, significant social problems (e.g., crime,
welfare, the breakdown of the family, drugs, teenage pregnancy, and dead-beat
dads) seem to be linked in political discourse to African Americans. The
affirmative action debate, thus, has again centered on the intellectual or
cultural inferiority of African Americans.133
While it might not be constructive to provide relative weight to each
marginalized group’s suffering—such tactics have the potential effect of
pitting marginalized groups against each other—few can deny that African
Americans have tougher battles than other social and political groups. The
stigma of being Black has a long history—one that began long before this
country was founded. Jordan explained that even before the English and others
colonized the new world and Africans were enslaved, they were seen as
libidinous, ugly, of defective religion, and savage.134 Thus, the story of the
stigmatized minority plays upon the symbols of African Americans’ inferiority
that shape the perceptions of these individuals and influence how they are
treated.
4)

The Story of the “Innocent White Victim”135

The story of the “innocent White victim” is similar to that of the
“intentional discriminator” in that there is some difficulty justifying a
“penalty” to an individual who has not been deemed to have committed a
wrong. In this regard, the story supports the predominant liberal-humanist
stories of self-determination, free will, and moral responsibility. As Ansley
argued, the emergence of the innocent White victim rhetoric evidences the
shift in antidiscrimination jurisprudence from altruism to individualism.136 But
the story of the innocent White victim has other connotations. It re-frames
discrimination, not as that which is validated by a history of state-sanctioned
racial oppression, but as the “victimization” of the White individual who has to
bear the penalty for that history. Furthermore, the story of the innocent White

132. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES A. MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
(1994).
133. Dinesh D’Souza furthered the notion of cultural inferiority when he argued that the
reason African Americans do not do as well as other racial groups on standardized tests is
“cultural breakdown.” D’Souza & Edley, supra note 40, at 430.
134. Winthrop Jordan, First Impressions: Libidinous Blacks, in IN FROM DIFFERENT SHORES,
supra note 119, at 41-51.
135. The rhetoric of innocence has appeared in regard to males. I use the racial connotations
in this essay, however, because they predominate in the affirmative action discourse.
136. Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1014 (1989).
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE
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victim is an effective rhetorical strategy for thwarting efforts to remedy that
historically-validated oppression because its “facts” can not be contested by
anyone; that is, an affirmative action benefit for one individual necessarily
results in a denial of the benefit to another.
The story of the innocent White victim appears in most affirmative action
cases. Consider, for example, two elaborations of the story—the first by Justice
Powell in Wygant; the second by Justice Scalia in Johnson:
Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the Board’s asserted purposes
is that of laying off nonminority teachers with greater seniority in order to
retain minority teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential-layoffs scheme imposes on
innocent parties. . . . Layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their
lives.137
It is unlikely that today’s result will be displeasing to politically elected
officials, to whom it provides the means of quickly accommodating the
demands of organized groups to achieve concrete, numerical improvement in
the economic status of particular constituencies. Nor will it displease the world
of corporate and governmental employers . . . for whom the cost of hiring less
qualified workers is often substantially less—and infinitely more predictable—
than the cost of litigating Title VII cases and of seeking to convince federal
agencies by nonnumerical means that no discrimination exists. In fact, the only
losers in the process are the Johnsons of the country, for whom Title VII has
been not merely repealed but actually inverted. The irony is that these
individuals—predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized—suffer this
injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the
politically impotent.138

In Powell’s story, the “innocent parties” were White teachers who were laid off
by the School Board despite having more seniority than the minorities who
kept their positions; the concern of this story appears to be the disruption in the
plaintiffs’ lives due to social forces they personally did not initiate. Scalia’s
story, however, is different in a two significant ways. First, he frames the story
so melodramatically that he need not mention the term “innocence” to make
the story effective. Second, Scalia’s story creates a “victim” out of much more
than particular plaintiffs—it creates “victims” out of (1) a whole class of
politically-weak individuals, who will be abandoned by the Court; (2) the
political process, because it will have to respond to the political demands of
organized groups (presumably racial minorities and White women); (3) the
integrity of meritocracy, because employers will have to hire “less qualified”
individuals in order to avoid being sued by (presumably) racial minorities and

137. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-3 (Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
138. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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White women; and (4) the Supreme Court itself, because it will turn away from
its asserted moral imperative—one that champions the cause of the politically
weak, which White males are. Scalia’s story, much more so than Powell’s,
utilizes melodrama to “victimize” individuals, values, traditions, and history.
The effectiveness of the innocent White victim story might be that it is
realized in practice in the transformation of antidiscrimination law. As Kairys
indicated, the rhetoric of innocence leads to two related practices.139 First, the
discrimination claims of African Americans, other racial and ethnic minorities,
and White women, are rendered nearly impossible to prove by a series of what
purports to be just evidentiary and burden rules. There is now skepticism,
Kairys argued, that Whites have discriminated (or continue to do so), even
when there is strong evidentiary proof of it. Second, Whites’ claims of
discrimination have been greatly facilitated and enlarged, so that now
they have next to no burden. They don’t have to prove purposeful
discrimination with any kind of detailed proof. The moral tone of the opinions
is a strong moral repudiation. There’s judicial activism without a mention of
the judicial restraint language that fills the opinions when minorities or women
raise discrimination claims.140

It appears that the story of the innocent White victim serves as a crucial
rhetorical device for re-thinking, and consequently changing, the meaning and
practice of antidiscrimination law.
There might be a psychological basis for the story of the innocent White
victim as well. Underlying this rhetoric of innocence might be, as Ross argued,
Whites’ psychological need to avoid facing their advantaged status in this
society. Ross argued that this rhetoric obscures this question: “What White
person is ‘innocent,’ if innocence is defined as the absence of advantage at the
expense of others?”141 This argument casts the question of innocence as one of
equity rather than responsibility. Furthermore, Ross argued that the symbol of
innocence, one of the most powerful symbols of our culture, is almost always
presented opposite the symbol of the “defiled taker.”142 Thus, in the affirmative
action rhetoric of college admissions, for example, the “innocent” White
applicant to a prestigious college is coupled with the “defiled taker,” the racial
minority admitted in the “innocent’s” place. Ross’ arguments reveal how the
story of the innocent White victim makes difficult the discrediting of plaintiffs
in the affirmative action cases. The story focuses attention on the individual
being “disadvantaged,” such as, say, Allan Bakke. He was denied admission to
the University of California-Davis Medical School, and perhaps his denial

139. David Kairys, Race, Law, and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (1996).
140. Id.
141. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 301 (1990).
142. Id. at 310.
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resulted in the admission of racial minority student with “less qualifications.”
In such a story, Bakke is an “innocent victim” burdened with the indiscretions
of history.
Ross argued as well that this rhetoric of innocence is connected to
“unconscious racism,” in the sense that Whites have many negative beliefs and
feelings about non-Whites. Thus, the innocence rhetoric “represses” this
racism by (a) allowing Whites to deny the charge of racism, and (b) denying
racial minorities actual victim status.143 Devins contested Ross notion of
“unconscious racism” because it goes to far. “Disparities in employment,
education, and housing may well be caused by factors other than conscious and
unconscious racism.”144 Devins’ arguments, however, appear too ahistorical,
and he falls into the trap of accepting notions of intention. Ross’ argument has
merit, but perhaps in a slightly different sense than he intended. Ross implies
that the innocence rhetoric “represses” unconscious racism. But such an
argument falls too close to what Balibar argued is the pitfall of anti-racism
discourse: it is too embedded in the rationalist notions of prejudice or false
consciousness.145 For reasons that I will explain later in more detail, racism can
not be deemed to result from prejudice, false consciousness, or any notion that
implies intention.
The story of the innocent White victim, however, might be connected to
racism, but it does not purport to deny that racism—at least not the stories in
the Supreme Court cases. Not many Justices (or people, perhaps) deny Whites’
historically-validated subordination of racial minorities (or men’s oppression
of women, etc.), or that racism’s effects still linger. But the story might work
because it furthers, to borrow Sedgwick’s metaphorical phrases, the “privilege
of unknowing,” or the “open secret.”146 The story allows individuals who use it
to look away from their privileges—especially those ensured by race, gender,
and class. The story allows those individuals to keep those “open secrets”—the
existence of privileges, and how they benefit from them—”hidden” in the
closet.
5)

The Story of “Racial Hostility”

Consider these elaborations of the story of racial hostility:
By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory
considerations [e.g., common stereotypes, innocent persons], we would be
holding, as a constitutional principle, that judicial scrutiny of
classifications touching on racial and ethnic background may vary with the
ebb and flow of political forces. Disparate constitutional tolerance of such

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 310-12.
Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REV. 15, 44 (1991).
Balibar, supra note 130, at 199.
EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 80 (1990).
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classifications may well serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms
rather than alleviate them.147
The perceptions of the excluded class must also be weighed, . . . [since]
there is the danger that the ‘stereotypical thinking’ that prompt policies
such as the FCC rules here, ‘stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the
unproven charge of past racial discrimination.’ . . . Until the Court is
candid about the existence of stigma imposed by the racial preferences on
both affected classes, candid about the ‘animosity and discontent’ they
create, and open about defending a theory that explains why the cost of
this stigma is worth bearing and why it can consist with the Constitution,
no basis can be shown for today’s casual abandonment of strict scrutiny.148

The story appropriates the understanding of the history of racial hostility to
justify a restriction of affirmative action. One may argue that the use of the
terms connoting hostility (e.g., antagonism, discontent, tension) does not mean
anything other than that affirmative action will create conflict in social
settings. But the “story of racial hostility” is troublesome, as Edley pointed out,
because it epitomizes the “classic ‘blame the victim’ strategy and could be
rephrased as, ‘if you will be quiet, we will all be more comfortable.’”149
Furthermore, when combined with the story of the “innocent White victim,”
one can see that the attribution of blame for racial strife to racial minorities
absolves White aggressors of moral responsibility for their hostile reaction to
racial minorities on college campuses or employment settings.
Perhaps the story of racial hostility reflects judges’ reliance on sociological
theories that analyze race relations as class struggles: the main idea being that
racial antagonism is a manifestation of underlying economic relations. Lal
explained that racial conflict arises when the socially dominant group
perceives a real or imagined threat to an established way of life as a result of
claims by subordinate groups for a greater share of resources.150 But, as Wilson
and Braddock explained, the class-based theories of racial hostility “neglect the
importance of a coherent ideological formulation that sanctions and legitimates
race-based differences in labor market placement, that, ultimately, result in
differential economic rewards based on race.”151 Wilson and Braddock
asserted that race relations since the 1980s reflect the predominance of a “new
racial ideology.” This racial ideology has several tenets, including (a) racial
discrimination does not exist anymore, (b) African Americans receive
preferential treatment, (c) support for race-based policies to remedy
147. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299-8 (Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
148. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636-7 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
149. D’Souza & Edley, supra note 40, at 439.
150. Barbara B. Lal, Symbolic Interaction Theories, 38 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 421, 427
(1995).
151. George Wilson & Jomills Braddock, Analyzing Racial Ideology: Post-1980 America, in
POSTMODERNISM & RACE 129-43, at 132 (Eric Mark Kramer ed., 1997).
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socioeconomic inequality has declined, and (d) African Americans are
personally responsible for their disadvantaged status. If Wilson and Braddock
are correct, then courts, as ideological state apparatuses, further this racial
ideology through their stories.
The use of terms connoting hostility in race discourse conjures up certain
images of violence: lynches, burning crosses, race riots, and so forth. Justice
Scalia explicitly uses these images. For example, consider his use of the story
of racial hostility in two passages from Croson to justify his anti-affirmativeaction stance:
At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to
the level of imminent danger of life and limb—for example, a prison race riot,
requiring temporary segregation of inmates—can justify an exception to the
principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’152
Apart from their societal effects, however, which are ‘in the aggregate
disastrous,’ it is important not to lose sight of the fact that even ‘benign’ racial
quotas have individual victims, whose very real injustice we ignore whenever
we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged on the basis
of race. As Justice Douglas observed: “DeFunis who is white is entitled to no
advantage by virtue of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter
what his race or color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right to have
his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral
manner.” When we depart from this American principle we play with fire, and
much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson, or Croson burns.153

It is difficult to read Scalia’s words without shuddering at their reiterations of
racial violence. Scalia’s stories exemplified most clearly, following Cover, the
violence of the judicial word.154 Cover’s elaboration of juridical violence
underscores the power of the judiciary to enact violence through speech.155
While Cover did not refer specifically to the stories judges tell to justify their
initiations of the mechanisms of violence, we can use Cover’s notion to
152. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Scalia, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
154. Justice Scalia’s “race” stories are problematic in other contexts as well, conjuring up
images of violence, especially in the forms of “fires.” For example, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992), a case in which the Supreme Court overturned the conviction [under a biascrime statute] of a seventeen-year-old skinhead who burned a crudely-made cross on the lawn of
the only African American family in his neighborhood, Scalia’s majority opinion used the
metaphor of fire to justify his belief that the real offense was the disregard of the First
Amendment: “Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone’s front
yard [note how he stripped away the identity of the victims] is reprehensible. But St. Paul has
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to
the fire.” Id. at 2550. For a wonderful rhetorical analysis of this case, see JUDITH BUTLER,
EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 52-65 (1997).
155. BUTLER, supra note 154, at 47.
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explain, using Scalia’s example, that violence is enacted through interpretation
and through persuasion.
Judicial speech, as Cover explained, does not occur outside the context of
violence. But in a racially-stratified world, the judicial stories enact violence in
another sense: they justify the racial hierarchy as “obvious” and blame
minorities for the racial disparity. Court speech, then, not only constitutes the
social world linguistically, as White theorized, but in practice as well because
that speech carries the power of the State. The stories, therefore, are not just
rhetorical devices, they are “practices.” How can speech be “practice”? In
order to understand how speech can manifest itself in practice, one need
understand the notion of “performatives.” Following J. L. Austin, Butler
explained that performativity refers to words that not only name, “but also in
some sense . . . perform what [they] name. . .”156 For Butler, in order for the
performative to succeed—that is, to perform what it names—it must echo prior
actions and accumulates “the force of authority through the repetition or
citation of a prior and authoritive set of practices.”157 What this means, Butler
explained, is that a performative “works” to the extent that it draws on and
covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized.
Courts, of course, are state apparatuses; thus, their words are “sovereign
performatives”158—they perform what they name—because they accumulate
the force of juridical convention. But the stories draw on other conventions that
ensure their performativity. To illustrate, Scalia’s speech enacts violence
through rhetoric and practice; as juridical speech, Scalia’s words rise to level
of sovereign performative, but it also draws on the “authoritive set of
practices” of racial oppression (e.g., race riots, fires, cross burnings) to gain
performativity. The story of racial hostility brings forth conventions of social
domination, and in doing so, symbolically enacts them again through language.
The story of racial hostility, thus, exemplifies the symbolic violence of
language in race discourse.159 And its performativity allows it to “perform
what it names” in antidiscrimination law, namely the social domination of
racial minorities.
6)

The Story of “Color-Blindness”

The story of “color-blindness” is one of the most powerful rhetorical
strategies for thwarting affirmative action initiatives.160 Williams noted how
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 71-82.
159. See Karen A. Callaghan, Symbolic Violence and Race, in POSTMODERNISM AND RACE
65-77, at 71-75 (Eric Mark Kramer ed., 1997).
160. Legal scholars have debated the notion of color-blindness for some time. Those
contesting existence of color-blindness include: Frances L. Ashley, Stirring the Ashes: Race,
Class, and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989); Amy L.
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problematic the ideal of color-blindness is for African Americans, who can
attest to its potential for liberating purposes (e.g., when it is used to eliminate
segregation), while experiencing a world that is anything but color-blind.161
The story works because it gets its strength from the model of formality,
“common sense” understanding of history (that led to the passage of
antidiscrimination law in the first place), and the liberal-humanists discourse of
individualism. The story, however, is frequently contradicted, often within the
same case. Consider, for example, the following two stories—the first is from
Justice Powell in Bakke, who used the history of racial oppression, and
previous Supreme Court cases dealing with it, to justify his stance that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied with equal force to Whites as it did to racial
minorities; the other is from Justice Brennan in Bakke, who used the same
history of racial discrimination to make an opposite argument:
Because the landmark decisions in this area arose in response to the continued
exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American society, they could be
characterized as involving discrimination by the “majority” [note the inverted
commas] white race against the Negro minority. But they need not be read as
depending upon that characterization for their results. It suffices to say that
“over the years, this Court has consistently repudiated ‘distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’162
Our Nation was founded on the principle that “all Men are created equal.” Yet
candor requires acknowledgment that the Framers of our Constitution, to
forge the 13 Colonies into one Nation, openly compromised this principle of
equality with its antithesis: slavery. The consequences of this compromise are
well known and have aptly been called our ‘American Dilemma.’ . . . Against
this background, claims that law must be ‘color-blind’ or that the datum of
race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather
than as description of reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality
rebukes us that race has too often been used by those who would stigmatize
and oppress minorities. Yet we can not—and, as we shall demonstrate, need
not under our Constitution or Title VI, which merely extends the constraints of
the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties who receive federal funds—let
color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many ‘created
equal’ have been treated within our lifetime as inferior both by law and by
their fellow citizens.163
Knickmeier, Blind Leading the Color-blind: The Evisceration of Affirmative Action and a Dream
Still Deferred, 17 N. ILL. L. REV. 305 (1997).
Those defending color-blindness include: Hand, supra note 93, at 799-860; John
Marquez Lundin, “The Call for a Color-blind Law,” 30 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 407 (1997).
161. PATRICIA J.WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE
(1997).
162. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 (Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
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Note how the story of color-blindness effectively manipulates history. Powell’s
story not only manipulates American history, but also Supreme Court
precedent; it can not work without doing so because there exists irrefutable
evidence of racial oppression (e.g., slavery). The story alludes to cases that
“repudiated” ancestry “distinctions” as “odious;” yet, those cases all involved
Whites’ discrimination of racial minorities. Arguing that those cases “need not
be read” as only prohibiting the oppression of racial minorities, the story then
ignores the historical contexts in which those cases were decided and argues
that discrimination against Whites is also that which was “constantly
repudiated.” The story’s choice to extend the Equal Protection Clause to
Whites then became precedent; other judges repeatedly cited this story as
precedent for the argument that the affirmative action equates with the kinds of
discrimination that has historically been the Court’s concern in
antidiscrimination law. Brennan’s story, of course, also uses history, but this
story does require as much manipulation of history as Powell’s because it
coincides with the those stories told by historians, social scientists, “common
sense,” and even the Court’s own prior cases.
The manipulation of history is very prominent in these stories, but this can
not be attributed only to politically-conservative stories. Consider these
examples from Croson of the use of history to justify contrary stances on
affirmative action— the first is from Justice Scalia; the others are from Justice
Marshall:
It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered discrimination
immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups. But those who
believe that racial preferences can help to ‘even the score’ display, and
reinforce, a manner of thinking by race that was the source of the injustice and
that will, if it endures within our society, be the source of more injustice still.
The relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews, or Irish who were
discriminated against, but that it was individual men and women, ‘created
equal,’ who were discriminated against. And the relevant resolve is that it
should never happen again. Racial preferences appear to ‘even the score’ (in
some small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that our society is
appropriately viewed as divided into races, making it right that an injustice
rendered in the past to a black man should be compensated for by
discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that embrace. Since blacks
have been disproportionately disadvantaged by racial discrimination, any raceneutral remedial program aimed at the disadvantaged will have a
disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks. Only such a program, and not
one that operates on the basis of race, is in accord with the letter and the spirit
of our Constitution.164

164. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527-8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when the former capital of the
Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of racial discrimination in
its midst.165
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different standard of
review under the Constitution than the most brutal and repugnant forms of
state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court signals that it regards racial
discrimination largely a phenomenon of the past, and that government bodies
need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice. I,
however, do not believe this Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial
discrimination or its vestiges. In constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the
majority today does a grave disservice not only to those victims of past and
present racial discrimination in this Nation whom government has sought to
assist, but also to this Court’s long tradition of approaching issues of race with
utmost sensitivity.166

Scalia’s story indicates that the point of the history of racial oppression is not
that “Blacks, or Jews, or Irish” were victimized by discrimination, but that it
was the discrimination of “individual men and women, created equal.” This
story coincides with common sense—individuals were discriminated against—
but it ignores that those individuals were victimized by discrimination because
they were Blacks, Jews, or Irish. The history the story refers denies itself.
Marshall’s story conjures up images of the Civil War (“Capital of the
Confederacy”), state-sanctioned discrimination (“state-sponsored racism”), and
racial violence (“brutal . . . forms of state-sponsored racism”), but he also
manipulates Supreme Court precedent by stating that the Court ignores its
“long tradition of approaching issues of race with utmost sensitivity.” The
Supreme Court, Marshall well knows, often acquiesced to racial
discrimination, if not enforced it outright.167 One need only hear the words
Dred Scott and Plessy to know that the Supreme Court does not have a
tradition of dealing with issues of race with sensitivity (and the decision in
Croson certainly can not be said to illustrate such sensitivity). Marshall
manipulated this history probably to make the majority in Croson face its
hypocrisy in race matters.
Justice Kennedy manipulates history as well, but his story is different from
Marshall’s, or even Scalia’s:
Almost 100 years ago, in Plessy v. Ferguson, this Court upheld a governmentsponsored race-conscious measure, a Louisiana Law that required ‘equal but
separate accommodations’ for ‘white’ and ‘colored’ railroad passengers. . . .
The Plessy Court concluded that the ‘race-conscious measures’ it reviewed
165. Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 552-3 (emphasis added).
167. Perhaps Marshall meant that the Supreme Court has shown sensitivity to race issues
within the last 30 years or so. But a review of the race discrimination cases during the seventies
and eighties dispels any notion of race sensitivity.
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were reasonable because they served the governmental interest of increasing
the riding pleasure of railroad passengers. The fundamental errors in Plessy, its
standard of review and its validation of rank racial insult by the State, distorted
the law for six decades before the Court announced its apparent demise in
Brown v. Board of Education. Plessy’s standard of review and its explication
have disturbing parallels to today’s majority opinion that should warn us
something is amiss here.168

Kennedy’s story is significant for two reasons. First, it certainly underscores
the importance of the color-blindness ideal. But more important, it uses a
commonly-perceived symbol of racial oppression as a weapon against racial
justice. Kennedy appeared to say that any attempt to remedy racial injustice is
as “insulting” and “disturbing” as the result in Plessy, which for almost 60
years legitimated a state-sanctioned violence on racial minorities. This story,
by equating affirmative action with Jim Crow, ignores how Plessy codified in
law the racial prejudice against African Americans through its legitimation of
racial inferiority. And while affirmative action may discriminate against
Whites, it can not enact the kind of state-sanctioned violence against them that
Plessy and many other Supreme Court cases have enacted against African
Americans and other social minorities.
In one sense, these different views of color-blindness illustrate different
understandings of equality, such as the progressivism and conservatism
uncovered by West.169 But the story of color-blindness signifies more than
whether one views equality in a “formal” or “substantive” sense. The
commitment to color-blindness, Flagg explained, appears to indicate that the
more certain one is never to consider race relevant to any assessment of an
individual’s abilities or achievements, the most certain one can be that racism
has been overcome.170 This line of thinking, Flagg asserted, reflects
individualism, or “the traditional liberal view that the autonomous individual,
whose existence is analytically prior to that of society, ought never to be
credited with, nor blamed for, personal characteristics not under her own
control, such as gender or race . . .”171 Seligman made a stronger argument
about the pervasiveness of individualism in our political discourses. He argued
that the notion since the seventeenth century of “an ‘autonomous, agentic
individual—that makes civil society possible,’ . . . has come to the define our
very ideas of the private realm as well as our evaluation of it in respect to those
realms deemed more public in nature. In fact, the moral and ethical elevation
of the private arena—as that arena where virtue, morality, and conscience are
realized—over the public arena emerged concomitantly with the growing
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Western realization of individual agency and autonomy.”172 I do seek to
deconstruct individualism in this essay; I claim only that individualism
underlies the notion of color-blindness and gives it force, rather than racial
prejudice or ill-will on the part of the judges.
The story of color-blindness has disastrous effects for racial justice. It
works structurally by guaranteeing that courts discount history, acontexualize
law, and engage in formalistic rhetoric about race. As Kairys pointed out, the
notion works because it implies that racial minorities “have gotten too much;”
that “things have gone too far, and color-blindness brings things back to
neutral.”173 What this rhetoric has done, Kairys asserted, is created a basic
reversal of social roles regarding race: “we’re seeing a successful challenge to
the notion that the presumptive victims of racism are black, and the
presumptive racists are white.”174 Gotanda similarly asserted that color-blind
constitutionalism maintains Whites’ domination of non-Whites.175
Kairys’ and Gotanda’s arguments about color-blindness contend that we
are dealing with a new racial ideology.176 Wilson and Braddock make the same
argument when they stated that the conservative “backlash” to the economic
and political gains made by racial minorities since the mid-1960s has
manifested itself in a “relatively sophisticated and appealing ideological form:
specifically (couched in values that seemingly reaffirm ‘fair play’ and ‘equal
opportunity’), there have been growing calls for a color-blind society where no
special significance, rights, or privileges attach to one’s race.”177 The story of
color-blindness obscures the emergence of the “new” racial ideology from the
last 20 years or so, one that accomplishes the same results as state-sanctioned
discrimination, but this time using the laws (and symbols) intended to ensure
racial justice against racial justice itself.
The Significance of These Stories
Cover asserted, quoting J. B. White, that “law is best regarded ‘not as
machine for social control, but as what I call a system of constitutive rhetoric:
a set of resources for claiming, resisting, and declaring significance,’ . . . but I

172. Adam B. Seligman, Individualism as Principle: Its Emergence, Institutionalization, and
Contradictions, 72 IND. L. J. 503, 505 (1997).
173. Kairys, supra note 139, at 583.
174. Id. at 584.
175. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-blind,” in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 257.
176. Kimberlé Crenshaw made a similar argument when she argued that the “hegemonic” role
of racism in American ideology has always been premised on race-consciousness, which is not
only central to the domination of African Americans but also to Whites’ acceptance of the
legitimacy of racial hierarchy and their identity with elite interests. Crenshaw, supra note 125, at
112.
177. Wilson & Braddock, supra note 151, at 129.
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insist that it is those things in the context of the organized social practice of
violence. And the ‘significance’ or meaning that is achieved must be
experienced or understood in vastly different ways depending upon whether
one suffers that violence or not.”178 The stories discussed here, following
Cover, take place in the context of the organized social practice of violence.
The violence I refer is not “physical” in the common understanding of the
word—it is symbolic and ideological—but it manifests itself in “practices.”
The legal discourse that justifies a racially-stratified social order ensures
violence through the performative power of the judicial word, which is
accomplished not only through state power but also through the iteration of
conventions of social domination (e.g., the use of stigmas, racial hostility). The
courts’ enforcement of this domination, however, can not be said to result from
judges’ racial prejudice—judges might be unaware that they are involved in
the mechanisms of domination. In the rest of the essay, I speculate on the
complex link between racism, norms, and courts and provide a theory for why
courts legitimize social domination.
Racism is pervasive in this society, but it might be inappropriate to
attribute its persistence to prejudice, intention, social structures, or even
ideology—if that is taken to mean a concerted effort by the ruling class to
justify its social domination. Racism might be persistent and effective because
it is furthered by “knowledge” and “norms,” which constitute the basis for the
kind of prejudice, intention, social structures, and ideology that realize racism
into practice. Balibar noted the “contradictory” link between racism,
universalism, and nationalism. According to Balibar, universalistic notions of
human action and behavior are premised on a latent racial hierarchy.179
Universalistic notions become the bases of “knowledge.” In other words,
racism, according to Balibar, constitutes a mode of thinking; that is, ways of
connecting words with images to create concepts. At the root of this
“knowledge” is the need to know—the “desire for knowledge.”180 Balibar
theorized that humans beings want to know why things are the way they are.
Racism provides the answer: “because [racial] differences are the universal
essence of what we are.”181 Furthermore, when racism and universalism are
linked with nationalism, which is about creating national unity, then powerful
institutions, such as the legal system, are needed to help create that unity,
which in Western civilizations is premised on a racial hierarchy. The inherent
racial hierarchy in “knowledge” produces discourses that form the basis for the
meaning and organization of social institutions, practices, and relationships. If
Balibar is correct, then it is understandable why courts legitimize racial
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disparity—because racial differences are “universally and nationally
meaningful.”
Balibar provided an understanding of the role of “knowledge” in the
maintenance of oppression. Foucault linked knowledge and power to argue
against the conceptualization of power as the prerogative of states, institutions,
or classes of individuals. Power is ‘disciplinary’ and exists in every social
relation (e.g., in the family) and institution (e.g., in prisons, in courts, in
schools). Such power is ‘repressive’ in the sense that it determines, essentially,
what is “normal” and what is not, how things must be discussed, who has
authority to speak, and so forth. Furthermore, this disciplinary power is
repressive in another sense: it is linked significantly with the power of state
apparatuses. For example, according to Foucault, juridical power is now
“grounded in the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.”182 Stated differently,
disciplinary mechanisms legitimize juridical power, which in turn enforces, but
disguises, the processes of normalization. To illustrate this point, consider the
legal institutions’ legitimation of racial inequality. Despite the presence of
antidiscrimination laws, courts consistently refuse to uphold their tenets,
adhering to the belief that racial inequality is ‘natural’ (i.e., such inequality
results from merit, inadequate education, etc.).183 In this sense, legal analysis
should attend to how court decisions are informed by the normalizing
influences of social institutions and practices.
Power, however, is not inherently ‘repressive;’ it also is ‘productive.’ In
other words, disciplinary power ‘produces’ knowledge about individuals,
which often is used to justify oppression. Just as the panopticon would allow
for the examination of prisoners in order to ‘correct’ them;184 disciplinary
power examines individuals in order to ‘know’ them—and this “knowledge” is
used by others in order to ‘correct’ individuals or make them ‘normal.’ For
Foucault, power produces “absences and gaps: it overlooks elements,
introduces discontinuities, separates what is joined, and marks off
boundaries.”185 The knowledge established by disciplinary power creates
norms, and these norms are internalized by individuals and result in self-

182. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS &
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 105 (Colin Gordon trans. & ed., 1980).
183. See, e.g., the persuasive essays on the courts’ reluctance to enforce the legal and moral
imperatives of antidiscrimination law in: Derrick Bell, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM; Robert Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection
of Minorities, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER
(Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT SHAPED
THE MOVEMENT, supra note 5; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 108;
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 125; DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION.
184. FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 200-01.
185. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 83.
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regulation. Thus, for example, racial differences among individuals are
‘produced’ by social practices (e.g., standardized testing), and that
‘knowledge’ of racial differences initiates (or ‘coerces’) the processes of
normalization and self-regulation. That knowledge justifies discriminatory
practices, forces individuals to succumb to those practices, and makes it seem
natural that they should do so. Legal analysis, therefore, should pay attention to
these social practices—these local stories—in order to understand how they
provide the disciplinary coercion for juridical power. These local racial
discourses, formed in institutions, practices, and relationships provide the
“disciplinary coercion” and set the stage for the sovereign discourses of the
legal apparatus.
The affirmative action stories illustrate that courts accept as “universal” the
disparity of the social existence between Whites and racial minorities, and no
legal principle, such as Title VI, Title VII, or the Equal Protection Clause, can
change the universality or disciplinary power of that disparity. Racial disparity
results, these cases seem to indicate, not from the intentional or ideological
political and economic domination of one group by another, or even from
oppressive institutional practices, but from the knowledge of the inherent
differences between those groups—a knowledge which creates norms and are
realized in institutional practices. The challenge for progressively-minded
individuals is not to focus from “above” on the legal or state apparatus, but
from “below” on the normalizing influences of discourses which permeate
social relationships, practices, and institutions. And given how discourses use
language and stories, resistance might begin with reconstituting the stories that
predominate in affirmative action discourse.
RESISTING THROUGH “COUNTER-STORIES”
The pervasiveness of social hierarchies in ways of thinking encourages
pessimism. But resistance is possible. Cover, for example, argued that a judge
may or may not be able to “change the deeds of official violence, but she may
always withhold the justification for this violence. She may or may not be able
to bring a good prison into being, but she can refrain from sentencing anyone
to a constitutionally inadequate one.”186 To understand the possibility of
resistance, one needs to understand the law’s constitutive rhetoric, to borrow
White’s words, and how it furthers social domination. This constitutive
rhetoric might itself be the key to resisting social domination. Because judicial
stories take place in a “community,” they are vulnerable to innovation and
subversion. Since courts rely on legal scholars and other researchers for
guidance, these scholars must assert counter-stories to traditional legal
jurisprudence. I offer in this section three “theoretical” suggestions for
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resisting the predominant discourse that supports oppressive social structures;
these suggestions are theoretical in that involve ways of thinking, and, as a
result, they are subject to practical application and evaluation.
First, progressive scholars should reject universalism or other stories that
purport to “discipline” individuals to particular ways of thinking or behaving.
Foucault might be correct when he argued that resistance to disciplinary power
must be “anti-disciplinarian.”187 In other words, progressive scholars must
expose the historical contents of oppressive disciplinary notions, and then
counteract them by asserting non-oppressive ones. Progressive legal scholars
more so than others have the social authority to assert counter-stories that
constitute social justice. Although these counter-stories will encounter
resistance from predominant stories that support oppression, to be iterated
counter-stories must be in circulation. For example, legal scholars might tell
stories that expose the role of mathematics (e.g., in defining, quantifying, and
standardizing intelligence) in the mechanisms of oppression.
Second, the “court speech act” should be resisted when it is oppressive.
Although court speech functions with sovereign performativity, resistance
becomes possible if one accepts, as Judith Butler contended, that all speech
acts are vulnerable to “insurrectionary” counter-speech. Progressive scholars,
perhaps especially those in law schools, should produce “insurrectionary acts”
that assert critical perspectives of the law, the sciences, and “common sense.”
These scholars could, for example, assert how law furthers certain political
interests, but also how vulnerable (and unstable) these interests are to
discursive practices. These acts alone, of course, can not change the sovereign
speech act, but they begin to resist the power of its performativity.
Finally, progressive scholars must understand that individual resistance
makes a difference. If power is localized, per Foucault, in “disciplinary
mechanisms,” then progressive scholars must understand and resist the system
of localized acts, beliefs, and historical contents that underlie them. All
individuals in all social settings discipline and are disciplined, but the
oppressive nature of a particular discipline can be resisted. For Foucault,
power and resistance were related; the existence of power depends on a
“multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target,
support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present
everywhere in the power network.”188 This may mean that resistance is never
outside of power, but it also may mean that resistance can subvert certain
mechanisms and make them less physically oppressive. Stated differently,
resistance may be directed toward stripping away oppressive mechanisms’
links to social, economic, and cultural hegemony. Though the general
normalizing functions of power may not be subject to subversion, any
187. FOUCAULT, supra note 18, at 108.
188. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 95.
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particular norm (e.g., the norm(s) that constitute ‘intelligence’) can be resisted.
If power is localized, then social activism begins locally—in classes, in
departments, in institutions, in communities. As Gordon explained, changes in
practices and beliefs start at the local level, which then get interlinked in
national and international affiliations that begin to change attitudes and
motives.189 Progressive scholars might, for example, question normative
admissions policies within their own departments. No one, therefore, should
see himself or herself as insignificant in initiating social change.

189. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics in THE POLITICS OF
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